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CALL FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS DECISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
ALAN ARMSTRONG*
I. INTRODUCTIONIN RECENT YEARS, the aviation enforcement bar has wit-
nessed repeated and unfounded departures by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or Board) from established
precedent in a manner that offends any notion of due process.
The beneficiary of this misconduct by the Board has been the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA or Agency). This behav-
ior by the Board has created a climate in which pilots and their
lawyers understand that the Board is no longer capable of fulfil-
ling its statutory obligation to adjudicate enforcement actions
brought by the FAA against airmen. Rather than acting as an
impartial arbiter in FAA enforcement cases, the Board now
functions as an ally of the FAA in pilot enforcement actions.
The inability of the NTSB to properly function as an impartial
appellate tribunal has created a crisis in the aviation enforce-
ment system.
Since the NTSB now administers rogue justice without regard
to its own rules or established precedent, any airman who
desires to achieve a semblance of due process must have the re-
sources to vigorously and effectively pursue and execute the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Meaningfully participate in a hearing before an NTSB law
judge, including setting up and preserving necessary af-
* The author is an aviation attorney and active pilot who lives and practices in
Atlanta, Georgia. He has testified before the House Aviation Subcommittee, has
written more than one hundred articles on aviation law and is a contributing
editor to the Lawyer-Pilots Bar Association Journal. Kathy Yodice, Esq., Jerry
Trachtman, Esq., James Janaitis, Esq., Bruce David Green, Esq., Robert Feldman,
Esq., Mark McDermott, Esq., and John McClune, Esq. reviewed, commented, or
provided suggestions about the content of this article, and the author appreciates
their contributions.
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firmative defenses and perfecting the record so that the
NTSB and the FAA cannot maintain during any appeal
from the initial decision or during an appeal from an
NTSB appellate decision to a U.S. court of appeals that
the pilot has "waived" his affirmative defenses;
2. Prosecute an appeal to the NTSB if the pilot is unsuccess-
ful at the hearing or effectively respond to any appeal
brought by the FAA if the pilot has prevailed at the hear-
ing before an administrative law judge of the NTSB; and
3. Effectively prosecute an appeal to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia or other appropriate
circuit court of appeals in the event the airman receives
an adverse decision from the NTSB.
No longer can the airman and his counsel reasonably expect
the Board to provide the airman with due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or even address
constitutional challenges to misconduct by the FAA. In fact, in a
recent line of Board decisions, the NTSB has declared, quite re-
markably, that it will not consider constitutional challenges raised by
the airman in litigation before the Board.' This disturbing
trend all but ensures that any airman who challenges the FAA's
decision to ignore its own rules, regulations, or policies will be
compelled to seek justice before a U.S. circuit court of appeals.
With all due respect to the NTSB, it is sacrificing the constitu-
tional rights of airmen to due process and fundamental fairness
due to a misguided belief that it must ensure "aviation safety" at
any cost. The consequence of this behavior is that the aviation
community increasingly realizes that the NTSB is not a fair and
I See Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095 at *3 (Jan. 16,
2008). The Board declared:
Respondents contest the arguments in Administrator's appeal
and urge the Board to affirm the lawjudge's decision. They argue
that due process of law binds the Administrator to follow the policy
adopted in 86.1. ...
The Board will not review the Administrator's determination to
pursue a matter through legal enforcement action. This is a matter
of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction "commences with the filing of a peti-
tion for review of an order of the Administrator and does not ex-
tend to an evaluation of the procedural steps leading to the
issuance of that order."
Id.; see also Moshea v. NTSB, 570 F.3d 349, 352-53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (rejecting the
Board's holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the airmen's argument
that the FAA had violated its own policy in failing to afford Moshea a waiver of
sanction under FAA Advisory Circular 00-58).
4 [ 75
CALL FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY
impartial arbiter of justice in the United States.2 As the Board
has lost its capacity to fairly administer justice, it has, in turn, lost
the respect of practitioners who appear before it.3
The Board would posture as though Congress is the villain in
this situation. Consider the following declaration by Robert V.
Combs of the Office of General Counsel of the NTSB:
Unless and until Congress changes the NTSB's statutory charter, the
Board's role is not really to adjudicate controversies between the
FAA and airmen, as one writer has recently suggested, but rather
it is to "amend, modify, or reverse" an "order of the Administra-
tor" that "amend [s], modiflies], suspend [s], or revoke [s]" an air-
man's certificate. In accomplishing that role, the Board is
"bound by all validly adopted interpretations of laws and regula-
tions the Administrator carries out and of written policy gui-
dance available to the public related to sanctions ... unless the
Board finds an interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or other-
wise not according to law."'
In the same professional journal where the comments of Mr.
Combs were published, the author wrote:
In a recent case, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) has declared that the FAA can ignore the unambiguous
provisions of its Compliance and Enforcement Program, FAA Or-
der 2150.3A (the "Enforcement Handbook") and take certificate
action against pilots even though the Handbook mandates issu-
ing a warning letter. This unfortunate decision issued by the
NTSB confirms that the members of the NTSB do not appreciate
or fully comprehend their function in dealing with enforcement
litigation. The NTSB no longer possesses the resolve to stand up
to the FAA when the FAA fails to enforce or follow its own inter-
nal policies and procedures. The decision of the NTSB which is
2 John Yodice, NTSB: An Impartial Forum for Pilots?, AOPA PILOT, Aug. 2009, at
40.
3 See id.
Notice that every one of these issues, without exception, went
against the pilot and in favor of the FAA, all without granting the
pilot the hearing, which the Act contemplates, to put on his side of
the case. This would not be so remarkable if it stood alone, and not
in the context with the many other cases we have seen, many of
which we have reported, in which the NTSB one-sidedly seems to
favor the FAA and disfavor pilots.
Id.
4 Robert V. Combs, The Enforcement Docket, LAWYER-PILOTS BAR Ass'N J., Spring
2008, at 31 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (2006)) (emphasis added).
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the topic of this article is evidence that the aviation enforcement
system in the United States of America is a dysfunctional system.'
It is the author's assessment as well as the assessment of U.S.
appellate court judges in any number of cases discussed in this
article' that the Board fails to grasp elementary legal principles
such as following binding precedent,' deferring to the findings
of fact made by NTSB administrative law judges,8 and requiring
the FAA to follow its own rules,' among others. However, to the
extent the Board's refusal to dispense justice consistent with ba-
sic due process principles is the fault of Congress, then an investi-
gation by Congress into the conduct of the NTSB in aviation
enforcement proceedings is essential if the problems discussed
in this article are to be corrected.
In the remainder of this article, we will review a number of
cases that graphically illustrate how the Board increasingly acts
in an arbitrary and capricious manner contrary to the constitu-
tional rights of airmen in the context of the scope of review ap-
plied by appellate courts pursuant to § 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). o In fact, while the Board will not, in the
current climate, reach constitutional issues raised by airmen, the
U.S. circuit courts of appeal, in reviewing decisions of the
Board, are required to:
[H]old unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
5 Alan Armstrong, NTSB Issues an Order Declaring that the FAA Can Ignore Policies
in its Own Enforcement Handbook, LAWYER-PLoTs BAR Ass'N J., Spring 2008, at 16
(emphasis added).
6 See, e.g., Moshea, 570 F.3d at 352; Andrzejewski v. FAA, 548 F.3d 1257,
1260-61 (9th Cir. 2008); Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1125-30 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Wedding v. NTSB, 96 Fed. App'x 527, 528 (9th Cir. 2004).
7 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1125-30; Andnejewski, 548 F.3d at 1260-61.
8 And9etewvski, 548 F.3d at 1260-61; Wedding, 96 Fed. App'x at 528.
9 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1125-30; Moshea, 570 F.3d at 352.
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to a trial de novo by the reviewing court."
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. THE EXPECTATIONS OF AIRMEN THAT THEY WILL RECEIVE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Certificated airmen in the United States have a reasonable ex-
pectation that they will be afforded fairness and due process
prior to the suspension or revocation of their certificates in any
proceeding before the NTSB. The expectation is based on the
fundamental right to due process under the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which provides: "No
person shall be .. . deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law."12
When an airman is the focus of an action to suspend or re-
voke his certificate, he will not be provided a hearing before a
jury of his peers. Rather, he will have a hearing conducted by a
hearing officer denominated as an administrative law judge
(ALJ) employed by the Board." The ALJ is governed by the
provisions of the APA and is required to give consideration to
"facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjust-
ment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public
interest permit."l 4 Generally, the ALJ is authorized to adminis-
ter oaths, issue subpoenas, rule on offers of proof, receive rele-
vant evidence, take depositions or have them taken, regulate the
course of the hearing, hold conferences for settlement or to sim-
plify the issues in the case, inform the parties of the availability
of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, require attendance
at conferences, dispose of procedure requests, and render deci-
sions in accordance with § 557 of the APA.15
Congress has directed that any airman who takes issue with an
action brought by the FAA to suspend or revoke his certificate
may appeal the order of to the NTSB. 16 When the Board con-
ducts the appeal, it shall, "[a]fter notice and an opportunity for
a hearing, modify, or reverse the order when the Board finds ...
11 5 USC § 706 (2) (A)-(F).
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
13 49 C.F.R. § 821.1 (2008) ("Law judge means the administrative law judge as-
signed to hear and preside over the respective proceedings.").
14 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1) (2006).
15 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(1)-(11) (2006).
16 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (1) (2006).
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that safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public
interest do not require affirmation of the order." 7
One reason airmen are currently unable to receive due pro-
cess of law from the Board arises from 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3),
which provides:
When conducting a hearing under this subsection, the Board is
not bound by findings of fact of the Administrator but is bound
by all validly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations the
Administrator carries out and of written agency policy guidance
available to the public related to sanctions to be imposed under
this section unless the Board finds an interpretation is arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not according to law.1 8
The foregoing deference provision was put in place by Con-
gress as part of the FAA Civil Penalty Administrative Assessment
Act of 1992." Unfortunately, the Board has, in recent years,
used § 44709(d) (3) as an excuse to refuse due process to pilots
on the theory that Congress has tied the Board's hands.2 0 As an
explicit illustration of this point, the FAA has promulgated the
FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program (the Enforcement
Handbook) .21 The Enforcement Handbook has, among other
1 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (1) (A).
18 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3).
19 Reina, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4552, 1997 WL 285022, at *1 (May 23, 1997).
20 The Board's staff attorneys are clearly of the belief that the Board does not
"adjudicate controversies" because that is contrary to the Board's "statutory char-
ter." See Combs, supra note 4, at 31. The belief that the Board does not adjudi-
cate legal issues between airmen and the FAA is echoed by the language
employed by the Board in Murphy where, in response to the airmens' assertion
that to allow the FAA to punish pilots in violation of FAA Enforcement Bulleting
86-1 violated their rights to due process, the same argument as that advanced by
Combs appeared in the Board's decision, i.e. "The Board's charter prevents that."
Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *3 (Jan. 16, 2008).
The author submits that the use of the term "charter" in Combs as well as in
Murphy is not a coincidence. Clearly, the Board's counsel maintain that address-
ing constitutional issues are beyond the 'jurisdiction" of the Board. See id. How-
ever, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed in Moshea, where the
court specifically found the Board was in error and did have jurisdiction to de-
cide if the FAA had to abide by its own rules and policies. Moshea v. NTSB, 570
F.3d 349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In fact, the court in Moshea declared Board prece-
dent did require the FAA to be bound by its own rules, declaring: "Moreover, in
Montgomery, the Board stated with regard to a similar FAA policy that 'regardless
of whether [the policy] is characterized as a rule, regulation, or statement of
policy, the Administrator is bound by its terms.' Id. at 351 n.2 (citing Montgom-
ery, 3 N.T.S.B. 2150, 2154 (1980)).
21 See FAA, Order No. 2150.3B, the FAA Compliance and Enforcement Pro-
gram, at 1 (Oct. 1, 2007).
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things, a sanction guidance table. 2 The sanction guidance table
outlines punishment for various infractions of the FAA regula-
tions. In a matter tried before an NTSB ALJ, the FAA attorney
will customarily place into evidence a copy of the sanction gui-
dance table and argue that the ALJ is bound to follow the sanc-
tions prescribed in the table. The FAA argument is that the
sanction guidance table is a validly adopted and publicly availa-
ble document and the NTSB is thereby bound by the FAA's "in-
terpretations of laws and regulations."2 ' But is a sanction
guidance table really an interpretation of laws and regulations?
Before Congress enacted the deference provision, sanctions
were determined by the ALJ in light of Board precedent, but the
ALJ could only reduce the sanction from that sought by the FAA
based upon a showing of clear and compelling reasons, as re-
quired by Muzquiz.2 1
After Congress made deference by the Board to the FAA a
statutory obligation, some ALJs persisted in either reducing the
sanction from the sanction sought by the FAA2 ' or changing the
sanction from a suspension to a civil penalty. 27 The FAA at-
22 The sanction guidance table for air carriers, airmen, mechanics airports, etc.
appears in FAA Order 2150.3B, Appendix B, pages B-13 through B-52. The haz-
ardous materials (HAZMAT) sanction guidance table is found in Appendix C of
the Order at page C-13.
23 Lepinski, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5019, 2003 WL 328993, at *1-2 (Feb. 6,
2003).
24 See Complainant's Mot. to Uphold Complainant's Sanction of Revocation,
Aug. 18, 2008, filed in Frick, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18271. The FAA photo-
copied excerpts from FAA Order No. 2150.3B, labeled same as exhibits, and
argued:
Under 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3): 'the Board. .. is bound by all val-
idly adopted interpretations . . . of written agency guidance availa-
ble to the public related to sanctions to be imposed under this
section unless arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not according to
law.' See also Garvey v. NTSB, 190 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1999). (sic)
The NTSB has the authority to modify proposed sanctions only
within the constraints imposed by the sanction deference provi-
sion.' Administrator v. Tweto, NTSB Order No. EA-4164. Accord-
ingly, Complainant requests that deference be given to his choice
of sanction in this case.
Id.
25 Muzquiz, 2 N.T.S.B. 1474, 1477 (1975).
26 See Tweto, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4164, 1994 WL 228257, at *1-3 (May 9,
1994) (granting the FAA's appeal and reinstating the sixty day suspension where
the ALJ had reduced the period of suspension to forty-five days).
27 See Lepinski, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5019, 2003 WL 328993, at *1-2 (Feb. 6,
2003) (reversing ALJ's decision to impose civil penalty rather than thirty day sus-
pension based on sanction deference under 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3)).
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tempted to seize the initiative after Congress imposed a statutory
mandate for the Board to defer to the FAA's choice of sanction
by arguing that, in the sanction analysis, the FAA's choice of
sanction was more important than an analysis of case prece-
dent.28 The Board rejected this argument observing:
In any case, we decline the FAA's request in this petition that we
reverse the hierarchy they have perceived and consider first the
FAA's sanction guidance. We hope we have now explained we
intended no hierarchy. Further, we agree with the general prin-
ciple that, if deference issues are joined, any analysis of case pre-
cedent takes place in the deference context. We see no need to
go further, and see (perhaps unintended) difficulty with the
FAA's approach.
While the FAA now routinely places the sanction guidance ta-
ble into evidence when arguing for deference, the Board has
intimated this may not be necessary, declaring:
Even when the Administrator has not introduced the Sanction
Guidance Table into the record and requested such deference,
we have still ordered a serious sanction when the respondent's
conduct indicates that the respondent acted in a deliberate man-
ner that demonstrates an unwillingness to comply with the
regulations.so
In one case an ALJ declined to accord the FAA deference on
sanction because the sanction guidance table had not been
amended after Congress enacted the FAA Civil Penalty Adminis-
trative Assessment Act of 1992.1
Another example of the information typically contained in
the FAA Enforcement Handbook is various enforcement bulle-
tins. For example, in Murphy,32 the FAA ignored an explicit di-
rective requiring that a warning letter be issued to the airmen
and directing that formal enforcement action not be pursued.
Despite the fact that the facts in Murphy fit all the criteria of the
FAA directive, the decision of the ALJ recognizing the affirma-
28 See Reina, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4552, 1997 WL 285022, at *1 (May 23,
1997).
- Id.
30 Poland, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5449, 2009 WL 1430664, at *3 (May 14,
2009).
31 See Schrader, 2003 WL 1957463, at *2 (Apr. 13, 2003).
32 Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *2-3 (Jan. 6,
2008).
See FAA, Order No. 2150.3A, FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program,
at 260 (Dec. 14, 1998).
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tive defense of the pilots based upon the directive was rejected
on appeal by the Board on the theory that the Board "does not
have jurisdiction to review the Administrator's discretion in
choosing to bring an enforcement action against a respon-
dent."3 4 There will be a more expansive discussion about this
case later in this article.
This decision violated a fundamental precept of constitutional
law that a government agency may not violate its own rules.
While today the NTSB takes the position it cannot reach consti-
tutional issues, it did not take this position in 1981 when the
Board decided Randall." In Randall, the FAA declared in its
FAA Enforcement Handbook that a flight data recorder tape
could not be used as evidence in an FAA enforcement proceed-
ing except as corroborating evidence. The declaration in the
Enforcement Handbook notwithstanding, the FAA revoked the
airman's certificate based solely on a flight data recorder tape.38
Judge Fowler, who tried the case, found violations of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) but reduced the sanction from a
revocation to a nine-month suspension.3 1 When the pilot ap-
pealed to the NTSB, the NTSB reversed the judge and cited
Vitarelli v. Seaton, declaring that the NTSB would not allow the
FAA to violate its own policies.4 0 The holding in Randall is im-
portant. The Board held that, even in the face of allegations of
performing aerobatic maneuvers in a transport jet aircraft, be-
cause the sole evidence was based on the flight data recorder
and the FAA Enforcement Handbook said that the flight data
recorder could not be the sole evidence in an enforcement case,
the order revoking the airman's certificate had to be reversed.4 1
However, twenty-seven years later in Murphy, the Board said it
could not reach constitutional issues and refused to force the
FAA to be bound by its own rules. 42 Because the Board has de-
clared that it will not reach constitutional issues, the Board can-
not (according to its self-imposed restrictions) dispense justice
in aviation enforcement proceedings. This is true because the
Murphy, 2008 WL 205095, at *4.
35 See infra section III.B.
36 Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624, 3625-26 (1981).
3 Id. at 3625.
3s Id.
3 Id. at 3624.
40 Id. at 3626 (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959)).
41 Id.
42 See Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *3-4 (Jan. 16,
2008).
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Board sanctions and allows the FAA to violate its own rules,
something no federal district court would ever tolerate.
When one contemplates the level of justice available to liti-
gants in federal district court, where there are strictly enforced
rules of evidence and procedure, that arena is a far cry from the
rules promulgated by the Board in furtherance of its statutory
authority." The Board has promulgated material denominated
as "Rules of Practice in Air Safety Proceedings."44 The Board's
Rules of Practice do not adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In fact, hearsay is allowed in aviation enforcement proceed-
ings."5 To underscore the significance of this problem, an air-
man may have introduced into evidence against him a letter
declaring he violated the Federal Aviation Regulations. The let-
ter cannot be cross-examined. How can a practice like this com-
port with the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution? Ostensibly, the burden of proof is on the
FAA in aviation enforcement proceedings. 46 However, armed
with the ability to get hearsay into evidence and also armed with
the language found in 49 U.S.C. §44709(d) (3), even the weakest
cases brought by the FAA may not be susceptible to a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
Prior to the hearing, the FAA shall have lodged a complaint,
and the airman has the responsibility to file an answer. The
answer of the airman "shall also identify any affirmative defenses
that the respondent intends to raise at the hearing."4 8 "Affirma-
tive defenses" is not a defined term in the Board's Rules of Prac-
tice. 9 Consequently, every conceivable argument the airman
could raise should be denominated as an affirmative defense
and pled as an affirmative defense in his answer, in detail. Fail-
ure to do so will result in the defense being waived according to
the Board's recent decision in Blum.5 0 For example, if the pilot
relied upon a bulletin in the FAA Enforcement Handbook or an
4 See 44 USC § 44709(d) (1) (2006) (permitting airmen to appeal an order
issued by the FAA to the NTSB).
44 See 49 C.F.R. § 821 (2008).
45 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.38.
46 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.32.
4 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.31 (a), (b).
4 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.31(b).
49 See 49 C.F.R. 821.1.
-o Blum, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5371, 2008 WL 647772, at *4 (Feb. 29, 2008).
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advisory circular such as Advisory Circular AC 00-46Dx (dealing
with the timely filing of an Aviation Safety Report with the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration), then the pilot
must set that out in his answer as an affirmative defense and
demonstrate how the facts in his case give rise to such a de-
fense. The pilot and his counsel must also be aware of the fact
that if the court fails to consider the defense, counsel must note
an exception in the record in order to preserve this for purposes
of appeal. Otherwise, the defense is waived since "the court may
consider an objection to an order of the Board only if the objec-
tion was made in the proceeding conducted by the Board or if
there was a reasonable ground for not making the objection in
the proceeding.""
There is case authority which stands for the proposition that
an airman's certificate is a protected property or liberty interest
that cannot be taken away without providing due process of
law.14 However, with no rules of evidence, hearsay being admit-
ted, affirmative defenses being undefined, and the fact that the
defenses will be waived unless counsel takes exception on the
record to the Board's failure to sustain or even address the
same, it takes little imagination to realize that the level of 'jus-
tice" provided by the Board to airmen is minimal at best. Unfor-
tunately, legal practitioners and judges are constrained by an
imperfect, deficient system. The foregoing description is but a
sample of the landscape in which the legal practitioner and his
client must toil as they undertake to pursue justice before the
NTSB.
III. A REVIEW OF CASES ILLUSTRATING THE
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS NATURE OF
DECISIONS BY THE BOARD
A. THE RAMAPRAKASH CASE
In Ramaprakash v. FAA, the airman had been convicted of
driving under the influence on February 25, 1997.66 He did not
report his conviction within sixty days as required by regula-
51 FAA, Aviation Safety Reporting Program, AC No. 00-46D 1 (Feb. 26, 1997),
available at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory-and GuidanceLibrary/rgAdvisory
Circular.nsf/list/AC%200046D/$FILE/AC0046D.pdf.
52 Blum, 2008 WL 647772, at *4.
53 49 USC § 1153(b) (4) (2006).
54 Green v. Brantley, 719 F. Supp. 1570, 1575 (N.D. Ga. 1989); White v. Frank-
lin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 610 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
55 346 F.3d 1121, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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tion. 66 Fourteen months after his conviction, the FAA initiated
proceedings to suspend his certificate.5 7 Ramaprakash moved to
dismiss the charges based on the stale complaint rule." In es-
sence, the stale complaint rule is the functional equivalent of a
statute of limitations and provides that the FAA must take action
against a pilot within six months of the infraction unless good
cause existed for the delay, or the case must go forward in the
public interest, or the facts revealed in the case evidence a lack
of qualification. 9 If the FAA cannot satisfy one or more of these
criteria, the case is to be dismissed.o
When an airman receives his medical certificate, identifying
data on his medical application is checked against the National
Driver Register (NDR).61 However, because the NDR data is not
sufficiently definitive, an FAA investigator must correlate the
NDR data to the National Law Enforcement Telecommunica-
tion System (NLETS) to ascertain the nature of any offense that
may have been revealed in consulting the NDR.6 2
In Ramaprakash, three separate FAA inspectors were charged
with evaluating the data the FAA had at hand but failed to pro-
cess in a timely manner." There was no dispute about the fact
that the FAA had been in possession of the source materials evi-
dencing a failure to timely report the driving under the influ-
ence conviction substantially more than six months before
issuing the Notice of Proposed Certificate Action (NOPCA).64
The Board, in a clear departure from precedent, took the po-
sition that because of the gravity of the alleged violation, lati-
tude should be given to the FAA to relax the stale complaint
rule.65 The decision of the Board was directly contrary to two
significant cases.6 6 Moreover, the Board's decision in
Ramaprakash was directly contrary to Dill, where charges to re-
voke an airman's certificate for alleged violations of FAR Part
135 were dismissed based upon application of the stale com-
56 Id. (referring to 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(e) (2009)).
57 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1122.
58 Id. at 1123.
59 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.33 (2008).
6o Id. at § 821.33(a) (2).
61 Ramaprakash, 346 F3d at 1123.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1123-24.
6 Id. at 1124.
65 Id.
66 US Jets, Inc., 7 N.T.S.B. 246, 246 (1990); White, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-
4100, 1994 WL 66062, at *1 (Feb. 20, 1994).
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plaint rule, since the FAA could not prove it had good cause for
its delay." After appealing to the five members of the NTSB
who voted to affirm the suspension by a vote of 3-2,
Ramaprakash took his pleas to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Then Circuit Court Judge Roberts, 8 be-
gan the opinion with the following remarks:
Learned Hand once remarked agencies tend to "fall into
grooves, . . . and when they get into grooves, then God save you
to get them out." Judge Hand never met the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board. In this case, we grant the petition for review
because the Board has failed adequately to explain its departure
from its own precedent in no fewer than three significant
respects.69
In a decision which can only be described as an embarrass-
ment to the Board, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
noted that (1) there was no good cause for delay under the stale
complaint rule according to the Board's own line of cases,o (2)
the airman did not have to demonstrate prejudice under the
stale complaint rule (again according to the Board's own line of
cases)," and (3) the Board had ignored its own long-standing
line of cases requiring prosecutorial diligence on the part of the
FAA.7 2 In short, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia found that the decision of the Board fit the mold de-
scribed in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a), i.e., "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."73
Judge Roberts, writing for the court in Ramaprakash, made the
following observation about the Board's arbitrary decision to
compromise the effectiveness of the stale complaint rule to the
benefit of the FAA:
This court has observed that "the core concern underlying the
prohibition of arbitrary or capricious agency action" is that
agency "ad hocery" is impermissible. Pacific N. W Newspaper Guild
Local 82 v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir.1989). The state-
ments extracted above indicate that the Board has failed to satisfy
this core requirement. They amount to a promise from the
67 Dill, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4099, 1994 WL 78131, at *3-4 (Feb. 20, 1994).
68 Former Circuit Judge Roberts is now Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
69 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1122.
70 Id. at 1125.
71 Id. at 1126.
72 Id. at 1127.
73 Id. at 1124, 1130.
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Board that at some point in the future, the stale complaint rule
may again mean what it once did - depending on "specific facts
of future cases." It is impossible at this point to tell whether the
Board, in the next stale complaint case, will assess the seriousness
of the violation, or not; will insist on a showing of prejudice, or
not; will require FAA diligence in investigating a possible viola-
tion as well as in prosecuting a known one, or not. We have it on
high authority that "the tendency of the law must always be to
narrow the field of uncertainty." O.W. Holmes, The Common Law
127 (1881). The Board's unexplained departures from prece-
dent do the opposite. "[W] here an agency departs from estab-
lished precedent without a reasoned explanation, its decision will
be vacated as arbitrary and capricious." ANR Pipeline Co. v. FERC,
71 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For the reasons stated, we
vacate the orders and remand to the Board for further
proceedings. 4
One would have hoped the Board would have learned from
its mistake in Ramaprakash and understood that decisions it ren-
ders must be consistent with its body of precedent and binding
case law. Unfortunately, as will be apparent from the discussion
of later cases, the NTSB failed to learn from its mistakes and
continued to compound them.
B. THE MURPHY CASE
Five years after the Board's actions were reversed in
Raniaprakash, the case of Murphy, came on appeal to the NTSB
after the airmen had prevailed before Judge William A. Pope II
attendant to the hearing that lasted two days on November
14-15, 2006.11 The facts in Murphy were quite simple. The case
involved a routine altitude deviation of 300 feet." The aircraft
were so far apart laterally that there was no indication that the
pilots of the aircraft ever saw the other aircraft. According to
the record before Judge Pope, the vertical separation was 700
feet and the lateral separation was 3.4 nautical miles.7 ' The
non-offending aircraft was a Canadair CRJ2 (Regional Jet) at
27,000 feet, while the offending aircraft was a Lear Jet at 26,000
feet that momentarily climbed to an altitude of slightly less than
74 Id. at 1130.
75 Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *1 (Jan. 16,
2008).
76 Id. at *1, *6.
77 Id. at *1.
78 Id.
16 [ 75
CALL FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY
26,300 feet.79 According to the testimony of the captain of the
Lear Jet, he observed the aircraft at 120 feet above its assigned
altitude and called this to the attention of his co-pilot, who ar-
rested the ascent of the aircraft and leveled the aircraft at 26,000
feet. 0 The parties stipulated that this was a "computer-detected
altitude deviation."81 According to the testimony of the air traf-
fic controller who was working the two aircraft, as the vertical
separation was compromised, the data blocks of the two aircraft
began to flash." This, in turn, set off an alarm at the desk of his
supervisor." There was no dispute about the fact that typically
in the en route environment there is 1,000 feet of vertical sepa-
ration and five miles of lateral separation.8 4 Because the vertical
separation was compromised by more than 20%, the data blocks
of the aircraft began to flash even though there was no sugges-
tion of a near mid-air collision or any evidence of a near mid-air
collision anywhere in the transcript.8 5 The FAA charged both
the captain and co-pilot with, inter alia, deviating from an air
traffic control clearance or instruction contrary to 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.123(a), (b), and careless or reckless conduct contrary to 14
C.F.R. § 91.13(a). 6
In their answer, the airmen set up as a defense their entitle-
ment to have the matter resolved by way of an administrative
action," for example, a "warning notice" or a "letter of correc-
tion."" The basis for the defense of the airmen was Compliance
Enforcement Bulletin No. 86-1,"1 which was an appendix to the
FAA Enforcement Handbook then in effect.o According to the
Bulletin, the FAA was obliged to resolve an altitude deviation
administratively by issuing a warning letter if the matter involved
(1) a computer-detected altitude deviation, (2) of 500 feet or





83 Id. at *1, *7, *14 n.4.
84 Id. at *1.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at *2-3.
88 Warning notices and letters of correction are administrative remedies em-
ployed by the FAA without resorting to legal (enforcement) action. FAA, Order
No. 2150.3A, Compliance and Enforcement Program, at 126-37 (Dec. 14, 1988).
8 Murphy, 2008 WL 205095, at *3.
o See FAA, Order No. 2150.3A, Compliance and Enforcement Program, at 260
(Dec. 14, 1988).
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aggravating circumstances, and (5) the pilot did not have a his-
tory of committing altitude deviations in the past five years."
According to the airmen, all of the criteria set forth in the Bulle-
tin were satisfied, and they were entitled to have the matter re-
solved administratively by the issuance of a warning letter as
opposed to having their licenses suspended.
Two former FAA employees testified on behalf of the pilots."
Francis Dejoseph, a former FAA flight standards inspector, indi-
cated that he would have resolved the matter by issuing a warn-
ing letter, since there were no aggravating circumstances."
Dejoseph noted there was no urgency in the voice of the con-
troller, and he did not direct either aircraft to turn or alter its
course.9 5 That confirmed the conclusion of Mr. Dejoseph that
there were no aggravating circumstances. Jack Overman, a for-
mer FAA air traffic controller, also testified the matter should
have been closed by issuance of a warning letter. 6 At the con-
clusion of a two-day hearing, Judge Pope found for the airmen,
reasoning that all of the criteria in Bulletin No. 86-1 were satis-
fied. In rendering his decision, Judge Pope found that the
FAA is bound to follow its own regulations and policies citing a
number of cases. One of the reasons Judge Pope found in
favor of the airmen was his conclusion that there were no aggra-
vating circumstances." He found that the altitude deviation was
momentary, inadvertent, and the risk to flight safety was mini-
mal. 00 He also found that the potential for collision was slight
and that the pilots in the Lear Jet arrested its ascent before ei-
ther aircraft was ever placed in actual jeopardy.10 1
The FAA appealed this adverse ruling to the full Board com-
posed of five members appointed by the President.1 0 2 Rarely do
91 Id.
92 Murphy, 2008 WL 205095, at *2-3.




9 Id. at *2.
98 Id. at *14 (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Steenholdt v. FAA,
314 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Brasher, 5 N.T.S.B. 2116 (1987); Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624 (1981)).
- Id. at *2.
100 Id. at *13.
10 See id.
102 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2006).
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all members of the Board actually read the trial transcripts.10
Rather, they rely upon staff attorneys to read the transcripts for
them and fashion opinions disposing of the issues on appeal.' 0 4
While there were a number of arguments raised by the FAA in
its appeal to the Board in Murphy, the principal argument ad-
vanced by the FAA was that the decision about whether or not
the FAA's decision to follow Bulletin 86-1 was a matter of
"prosecutorial discretion."' 0 5 In other words, as far as the FAA
was concerned, it could choose to ignore its own policies, proce-
dures, and rules, and the Board could not overturn that deci-
sion. 0 Unfortunately, just as the Board had done in
Ramaprakash, it chose to take an ad hoc stance in this case and
ignore not only Supreme Court authority in terms of Vitarelli v.
Seaton, but also the Board's own precedent in Randall, which
held that government agencies must follow their own rules and
policies.o' The following language extracted from the Board's
opinion aptly describes the issue the Board had before it in
Murphy:
Because of our disposition of the appeal, we address only one
of the Administrator's arguments. The Administrator argues that
his exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not subject to Board
review. He contends that the law judge substituted his judgment
for that of the Administrator to elect one remedy over another;
that it is the Administrator's prerogative to issue an order of sus-
pension when the facts support one; and that the Board has no
direct authority over his exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Respondents contest the arguments in the Administrator's ap-
peal and urge the Board to affirm the law judge's decision. They
argue that due process of law binds the Administrator to follow
the policy adopted in 86-1. Respondents contest the Administra-
tor's argument that 86-1 applies only to computer-detected alti-
tude violations discovered through the Air Traffic Quality
Assurance Program. Finally, respondents dispute the Adminis-
trator's argument that their altitude deviation involved aggravat-
ing circumstances.10
10 Interview with John Goglia, former member of the NTSB (Sept. 1, 2009)
(memorialized by the author's memorandum of Sept. 3, 2009).
104 Id.
105 Murphy, 2008 WL 205095, at *3.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The Board reversed the decision ofJudge Pope and reinstated
the FAA's suspension of the pilots' certificates making the fol-
lowing extraordinary declaration:
The Board does not have jurisdiction to review the Administra-
tor's discretion in choosing to bring an enforcement action
against a respondent. We reject the respondents' arguments that
86-1 precluded the Administrator from pursuing enforcement
actions against respondents. In sum, the Board finds that the
Law Judge's application of Bulletin No. 86-1 was not consistent
with the Board's statutory charter or with Board precedent, and
his decision in that regard is reversed."o'
The Board maintained that its statutory charter prevented it
from exercising jurisdiction over the claim that the FAA had vio-
lated its own rules.' Murphy and Vernick did not have the re-
sources to pursue an appeal to a U.S. court of appeals.
Accordingly, the decision of the Board in Murphy stood. How-
ever, as the next case demonstrates, the logic of the Board in
Murphy was flawed.
C. THE MOSHEA CASE
OnJune 30, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided Moshea v. NTSB."' As Murphy and Vernick
raised Bulletin No. 86-1 as a defense in their case, Moshea set up
as a defense in his case his compliance with the voluntary disclo-
sure program set out in FAA Advisory Circular 00-58.112 Just as
the Board had maintained it lacked jurisdiction to question the
FAA's decision to apply the Bulletin in Murphy, the Board de-
clared in Moshea that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain his af-
firmative defense based on the FAA's Advisory Circular.113
Moshea worked as a pilot for a commercial air cargo carrier
and had difficulty lowering the landing gear of an aircraft on a
flight.1 14 When he discussed the situation with a mechanic of
the company for whom he was employed, he was told the diffi-
culties were normal in cold weather.115 Moshea did not enter
the problem in the maintenance log of the aircraft in compli-
-on Id. at *4.
110 See id. at *4.
111 570 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
112 Id. at 350.
113 Id. at 351.
'1 Id. at 350.
115 Id.
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ance with 14 C.F.R. § 135.65(d)." 6 Several days later, when
Moshea was once again flying the aircraft, he still had problems
with the landing gear.' 1 7 This time, when he passed the infor-
mation on to a mechanic, the mechanic relayed the information
to his supervisor. 1 8 However, once again, Moshea did not make
an entry in the maintenance log of the aircraft.119 Rather, the
aircraft was scheduled for maintenance two days later.1 2 0 Dur-
ing that time frame, however, another pilot had difficulty lower-
ing the landing gear of the aircraft, and when the aircraft
landed, the landing gear was discovered to be damaged. 1 '
Moshea's employer, Key Lime Air Corporation, made a volun-
tary disclosure of the incidents to the FAA in accordance with
FAA Advisory Circular 00-58.122 The Advisory Circular declared
that the FAA would resolve issues of non-compliance by issuing a
letter of correction if the airman or other agent immediately
took action to report the violation to the employing entity. 123
The FAA took no action against other employees of Key Lime
other than Moshea.124 The FAA sought to suspend Moshea
from flying for sixty days.125 Moshea appealed the FAA's deci-
sion, but the ALJ who heard the case declared he lacked juris-
diction to consider the affirmative defense based on the
Advisory Circular. 1 2 6 Further, the ALJ refused to consider evi-
dence bearing on Moshea's compliance with the Advisory Circu-
lar.127 The ALJ reduced the sanction from sixty to fifty days.1 2 1
Moshea appealed to the Board and the Board affirmed, declar-
ing that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Moshea's affirmative de-
fense.1 2 9 The Board suggested (but did not declare) that
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
versed the Board for two specific reasons.13 1 The first was that
the Board did have jurisdiction over issues related to sanctions
as declared in 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (1).1 3 2 The second reason
was that the court concluded that the Board had failed to follow
its own binding precedent."3 3 In fact, the court remarked:
In Liotta, the Board thus exercised its jurisdiction to consider an
affirmative defense virtually identical to Moshea's. By departing
from the Liotta precedent without explanation, the Board here
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Cf Ramaprakash v.
FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("An agency's failure
to come to grips with conflicting precedent constitutes an inex-
cusable departure from the essential requirement of reasoned
decision making.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Board's inconsistent treatment of Moshea's case and Liotta's case
supplies an independent basis for vacating the Board's order in
this case. 1 3 4
The FAA argued before the court of appeals that the failure
of the NTSB to entertain the affirmative defense was harm-
less. 13 5 The court rejected this argument noting:
We cannot assume that the Board would have denied Moshea's
affirmative defense had such evidence been introduced; the
Board did not definitively analyze the significance (if any) of
Moshea's proffered evidence. Cf Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633,
640 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (no substantial prejudice where petitioner
"has presented no theory under which the weak record
prejudiced" his case). We therefore must decline the FAA's invi-
tation to resolve this case on harmless error grounds.1 3 6
In order that there is no question left in the mind of the
reader about whether the NTSB has jurisdiction to entertain af-
firmative defenses based on FAA policy such as Advisory Circu-
lars and Enforcement Bulletins, the following quote from the
opinion of the Court of Appeals makes clear that the Board
does have such jurisdiction: "The Board had jurisdiction to de-
cide whether the FAA's suspension of Moshea comported with
the FAA's voluntary disclosure policy set forth in Advisory Circu-
131 Id. at 352.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 352-53 (citing Liotta, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5297, 2007 WL 1920600,
at *6 (2007)).
134 Id.
13 Id. at 353.
136 Id.
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lar 00-58. We accordingly grant Moshea's petition for review,
vacate the decision of the Board, and remand it to the Board for
further proceedings."1 3 7
As we have now learned from the opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Board does have juris-
diction to entertain affirmative defenses based upon FAA poli-
cies and procedures. To the extent the Board said it lacked
such jurisdiction in Murphy, the Board was in error as confirmed
by the decision in Moshea. Unhappily, Murphy and Vernick
lacked the resources to take their case to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals where a just and reasoned decision could have been
achieved. Given the previous position of the Board to ignore
binding precedent and make up the rules as it goes along, now
more than ever, an airman who would defend himself against
charges brought by the FAA must secure the legal talent and
possess the economic resources to develop a record and take his
case all the way to a U.S. court of appeals. This statement will be
reinforced in the discussion that follows in the next section of
this article.
D. THE BLUM CASE
Another case illustrating the confusion being created by
Board decisions is Blum.13 8 The Blum case presented two sub-
stantive questions which should have resolved the case to the
benefit of the airman: (1) whether Blum was the pilot-in-com-
mand when he was being checked out in an aircraft by his flight
instructor who had filed a flight plan, and (2) whether the filing
of an Aviation Safety Report with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) within ten days of the occurrence
entitled him to a waiver of sanction based on Advisory Circular
AC 00-46D.1 3 ' The facts in Blum were that this was the pilot's
first flight in a Cirrus SR-20 aircraft with the flight originating
from Baltimore-Washington National Airport (BWI).140 Blum's
flight instructor had filed the flight plan, and Blum's instructor
assisted in taxiing the aircraft for departure.1 ' Radar plots of
the aircraft demonstrated that a transponder code of 1200 (a
standard VFR flight code) was being squawked for sixty-five
137 Id.
-n Blum, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5371, 2008 WL 647772 (2008).
13 Id. at *2.
14 Id. at *1.
141 Id. at *2.
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seconds after the aircraft had entered the Washington Air De-
fense Zone (ADIZ).1 4 2 The pilot being checked out in the Cir-
rus had been given a discrete transponder code of 4701, and he
erroneously selected 4710.143 Further compounding the
problems of this pilot was the fact that he had entered the Class
B Airspace. 1 4 4 As a result, it took about three minutes for the
pilot to get the correct transponder code selected, and he never
received a clearance to enter the Washington Class B Air-
space."' The pilot was charged with four violations of the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations: (1) violating Emergency Traffic Rules
NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 91.139(c);
(2) violating special security instructions contrary to 14 C.F.R.§ 99.7; (3) operating in Class B Airspace without a clearance
from Air Traffic Control contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 91.131 (a) (i);
and (4) operating an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner
contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a).1 4 6
The case was tried before Chief Administrative Law Judge
Fowler, and an FAA safety inspector testified that Blum was the
pilot-in-command during this instructional flight. 14 7 The author
submits that in federal district courts, where the Federal Rules
of Evidence are followed, counsel may have objected to the in-
spector's testimony on the grounds that applying the law to the
facts was a legal conclusion for the court to decide, not the in-
spector. 148 Moreover, to the extent the inspector was permitted
to testify with respect to an opinion declaring that Blum was the
pilot-in-command, his opinion was contrary to long-standing
precedent that, on an instructional flight, the flight instructor is
the pilot-in-command. 1 49 Next, after the inspector testified that
142 Id. at *1.
143 Id.
144 Id. at *2.
i45 See id.
146 Id. at *1, *5 n.2.
147 Id. at *1-2.
148 FED. R. EVID. 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testi-
mony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.
Since the inspector was testifying as an expert witness about flying but not as a
lawyer, he was not qualified to render a legal conclusion.
149 See Hamre, 3 N.T.S.B. 28, 38 (1977).
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Blum was the pilot-in-command, the inspector maintained that
Blum did not have to be the pilot-in-command to violate
NOTAM 6/2550 regarding the Washington ADIZ and Class B
Airspace. 150 In a federal district court, counsel could have ob-
jected that this too was the application of the law to the facts and
therefore a legal conclusion, since Judge Fowler could decide
whether or not someone other than the pilot-in-command could
have committed a violation by acting contrary to the NOTAM
and the restrictions of the Washington Class B Airspace."'
The pilot testified that he had a total of about 250 flying
hours and this was his first time to fly a Cirrus aircraft.1 5 2 Also, it
was his first time to fly with this particular flight instructor.'"
Finally, it was his first time to fly from BWI in twenty-five years of
flying.1 5 4 One of the purposes of this flight was for the instruc-
tor to teach the pilot how to fly in and out of BWI in light of the
Air Defense Zone rules and surrounding Washington Class B
Airspace. 55
The pilot admitted that the aircraft was operated inside of the
Washington Class B Airspace and the Air Defense Zone, but he
offered into evidence his Aviation Safety Report filed with
NASA."' The pilot maintained that he was entitled to a waiver
of sanction based upon the timely filing with NASA. 15 7 Para-
graph 7-6-1 (a) of the Aeronautical Information Manual pro-
vides: "The FAA has established a voluntary Aviation Safety
Reporting Program designed to stimulate the free and un-
restricted flow of information concerning deficiencies and dis-
crepancies in the aviation system." 15  Paragraph 7-6-1 (d) of the
Aeronautical Information Manual provides:
To ensure receipt of this information, the program provides for
the waiver of certain disciplinary actions against persons, includ-
ing pilots and air traffic controllers, who file timely written re-
ports concerning potentially unsafe incidents. To be considered
150 Blum, 2008 WL 647772, at *2.
151 While the inspector was competent to render opinions about flying under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, he was not qualified as a lawyer and should not
have been allowed to give a legal opinion.





157 Id. at *3-4.
158 See FAA, Aeronautical Information Manual: Official Guide to Basic Flight
Information and ATC Procedures, 1 7-6-1 (a) (2008).
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timely, reports must be delivered or postmarked within 10 days of
the incident unless that period is extended for good cause.15 1
The provisions of the Aeronautical Information Manual did
not reference the four elements that are outlined in FAA Advi-
sory Circular 00-46D, to wit: (1) the violation was inadvertent
and not deliberate; (2) it did not involve a criminal offense, acci-
dent, or action found at 49 U.S.C. § 44709; (3) the person has
not been found in an enforcement action to have committed a
regulatory violation in the past five years; and (4) the person
mails a report of the incident to NASA within ten days. 6 0
The oral initial decision and order rendered by Chief Admin-
istrative Law Judge Fowler did not specifically address Blum's
reliance on his Aviation Safety Report filed with NASA.1 6 ' How-
ever, contrary to established precedent that on an instructional
flight the instructor is always the pilot-in-command, the ALJ
declared:
Now, the Respondent attempted to make much of the fact that
Respondent Blum was not the pilot-in-command on this flight on
March 27th, 2006. That, in my estimation, based on the totality
of the evidence, has not only been successfully rebutted, but it
has been is [sic] shown, by the evidence, and particularly by the
aviation expert Eilinger, that not only was Respondent Blum the
operator of the aircraft, but that he was, in fact, the pilot-in-com-
mand of the aircraft. 162
Blum appealed the initial decision ofJudge Fowler upholding
a thirty-day suspension of his certificate to the Board, and in his
brief, Blum asserted that the "determinative issue ... is who was
the pilot in command of the aircraft when the individual in the
left seat was receiving dual instruction on how to operate the
aircraft and the other seat was [] an individual who was holding
herself out to be a 're-certified master flight instructor'. . . ."
Despite binding precedent to the contrary, the Board rejected
Blum's argument that he was not the pilot-in-command, declar-
ing: "Respondent does not recognize, however, that the decision
in this case does not rest on the determination of who was the
PIC."164
159 Id., at 7-6-1(d).
10 See FAA, supra note 51.
161 See Blum, 2008 WL 647772, at *2.
162 Id. at *7.
16s Id. at *2.
164 Id.
26 [ 75
CAILL FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY
Blum's lawyer had recently defended a flight instructor who
was found to be the pilot-in-command on an instructional flight,
and noted the inconsistency of the Board's position.' The
Board made this comment about that argument:
In that case, the respondent was a certified flight instructor (CFI)
on an instructional flight and respondent's counsel argued that
respondent was not the PIC. Although we found that respon-
dent was the PIC, and we discussed the issue at some length, we
must point out that the PIC issue was not the determinative issue
in that case because, regardless of whether the respondent was
the PIC, he committed a violation by his operation of the aircraft,
without regard to whether he was "in command." For the same
reason, the PIC issue is also not determinative in our decision
here. 166
The Board, contrary to its holding in Hamre, adopted the legal
conclusion of FAA Inspector Eilinger in finding that all the FAA
had to prove was that Blum operated the aircraft in the Class B
Airspace and in the Air Defense Zone, declaring:
As Mr. Eilinger testified, and as the Administrator points out in
his reply, in order to establish violations in this case, all need be
shown is that respondent operated or flew the aircraft in the
Class B and ADIZ airspace. The Administrator has done that,
and respondent does not contest the fact that he so operated the
aircraft. Further discussion on this issue, therefore, is unneces-
sary. We find that respondent violated the regulations as alleged.
Although the Administrator undertook to show also that respon-
dent was the PIC, the Administrator has not been able to do so,
primarily because this was an instructional flight and an instruc-
tor was on board. We conclude that respondent was not the PIC;
the law judge's initial decision should be modified
accordingly. 167
To the seasoned practitioner, the Board's decision is a com-
edy of errors. First, an FAA inspector with apparently no legal
training was allowed to sponsor a legal opinion about the ulti-
mate issue in the case.' 8 Second, if the Board and the FAA had
not been asleep at the switch, they would have realized the
165 Id.
166 Id. at *3.
167 Id.
168 See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702. While the inspector could sponsor opinion testi-
mony about flying, rendering a legal opinion on the ultimate legal issue was be-
yond the scope of his expertise. However, since the Board has failed to adopt the
Federal Rules of Evidence or any other meaningful rules of evidence, laymen are
allowed to sponsor legal opinions into the record. See 49 C.F.R. § 821.38.
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proper person to pursue in relation to an enforcement action
was Blum's instructor.1 6 9
If the Board's opinion had not already created sufficient con-
fusion in maintaining that Blum committed a violation without
being the pilot-in-command, it further chose to articulate a
meaningless legal standard about the circumstances under
which an Aviation Safety Report filed with NASA would afford
the pilot a waiver of sanction. First of all, the Board maintained
that the filing of an Aviation Safety Report was an affirmative
defense that the pilot should have raised in his answer.' Be-
cause the filing of the report was not raised by the pilot as a
defense, the defense was arguably waived, but the Board de-
cided to address the issue anyway."' In doing so, the Board
declared:
We do not normally entertain, however, arguments that are not
presented to us. Although respondent has not raised this as a
defense, to avoid a later assertion that it was raised based on the
evidence and the appeal brief, we address it only to the extent of
noting that, as the record stands, respondent did not meet the
conditions of the defense. 7 2
The troubling thing, however, is the fact that the Board went
on to engage in the following discussion:
Respondent argues that the law judge erred when he did not ac-
cept respondent's ASRP defense, and contends that the viola-
tions were inadvertent. We note that respondent did not raise
this defense in his answer to the complaint. We treat the respon-
dent's assertion that he was eligible for a waiver of sanction
under ASRP as an affirmative defense. In asserting an affirmative
defense, respondent must fulfill the burden of proving both the
factual basis for the defense and the legal justification. He must
satisfy the burden of establishing that he meets all criteria of the
ASRP, and is therefore eligible for a waiver of sanction. Respon-
dent has not done so. He argues only that his violation was inad-
vertent and, at the hearing, presented evidence only that his
report was timely, but no evidence to show that he fulfilled the
remaining criteria.1 7 1
With regard to whether a pilot has acted inadvertently in or-
der to avail himself of the waiver of sanction provisions of Advi-
169 Hamre, 3 N.T.S.B. 28, 28 (1997).
170 Blum, 2008 WL 647772, at *4.
171 Id. at *3.
172 Id.
173 Id. at *4.
28 [ 75
CALL FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY
sory Circular 00-46D, the Board made the following remarkable
pronouncement:
A person who turns suddenly and spills a cup of coffee has acted
inadvertently. On the other hand, a person who places a coffee
cup precariously on the edge of a table has engaged in pur-
poseful behavior. Even though the person may not deliberately
intend the coffee to spill, the conduct is not inadvertent because
it involves a purposeful choice between two acts-placing the
cup on the edge of the table or balancing it so that it will not
spill. Likewise, a pilot acts inadvertently when he flies at an in-
correct altitude because he misreads his instruments. But his ac-
tions are not inadvertent if he engages in the same conduct
because he chooses not to consult his instruments or to verify his
altitude. 174
Since the Board concluded that the airman had waived his
right to a waiver of sanction under Advisory Circular 00-46D, its
exposition in the order about deliberate versus inadvertent ac-
tions was completely unnecessary to the decision. Of greater
concern to the seasoned practitioner, however, is the fact that
the Board has articulated a standard that is meaningless. No one
can tell what is going on in the mind of a pilot in terms of
whether he misread his instruments or deliberately chose not to
read them. As demonstrated previously in this article by the ap-
pellate court's declaration in Ramaprakash,"" an essential re-
quirement of due process of law is predictability, for example,
that there is a uniform body of law that the practitioner can con-
sult and predict the outcome of a case given the facts readily at
hand or which the seasoned advocate reasonably believes he can
establish at trial. The current climate of the NTSB in which ex-
isting case law is ignored and meaningless standards are substituted is a
climate in which due process of law is being eliminated.
E. THE DILLMON CASE
The Dillmon case illustrates the extent to which the Board will
engage in revisionism and ignore a trial court record in order to
affirm a decision of the FAA to revoke, on an emergency basis,
an airman's medical certificate based upon an alleged falsifica-
tion."' In Dillmon, the airman was charged with falsifying three
medical application forms, the alleged falsifications arising out
174 Id.
175 See supra, section III.A.
176 See Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937 (Oct. 28,
2008).
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of his being convicted of ten counts of bribery.1 7 7 The FAA re-
voked his medical certificate on an emergency basis, and the
case was tried before Chief Administrative Law Judge Fowler on
October 2, 2008.178
At the outset, it is important to note than in order for a pilot
to have his medical certificate revoked for falsification, the oper-
ative regulation is 14 C.F.R. § 67.403(a) (1), which prohibits a
person from making, or causing to be made, a fraudulent or
intentionally false statement on his application for a medical
certificate.'1 7  To the extent the regulation requires proof of a
fraudulent or intentionally false statement, then, by definition,
the FAA bears the burden of proving that the airman acted with
the intent to defraud.18 0
In terms of the medical application form, Dillmon presented
extensive documentary evidence that the FAA had been aware
of the fact that the medical application form was vague and am-
biguous and, in fact, too ambiguous to satisfy due process of
law.' 8 1 Moreover, the question on the form that was under con-
sideration was question 18W dealing with: "History of nontraffic
conviction (s) (misdemeanors or felonies)."182 In the same area
of the medical application form under the caption denominated
as "conviction and/or Administrative Action History" was ques-
tion 18V asking about:
History of (1) any conviction(s) involving driving while intoxi-
cated by, while impaired by, or while under the influence of alco-
hol or a drug; or (2) history of any conviction(s) or
administrative action(s) involving an offense(s) which resulted in
the denial, suspension, cancellation, or revocation of driving
privileges or which resulted in attendance at an educational or
rehabilitation program.'
Dillmon testified that he had no intent to defraud the FAA,
and placed into evidence two exhibits: respondent's exhibit 1
and respondent's exhibit 2.184 Both of the exhibits were letters
177 Id. at *2.
178 Id.
179 14 C.F.R. § 67.403(a) (1) (2009).
180 49 C.F.R. § 821.32 (2008).
is See Dillmon, 2008 WL 4771937, at *4; see also Tr. of Proceedings at 104-11,
Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349, 2008 WL 4685542 (Oct. 2, 2008) [here-
inafter Dillmon Transcript].
182 See FAA, Form 8500-8, http://www.faa.gov/forms/index.cfm/go/docu-
ment.information/documentlD/185786.
183 Id.
184 Dillmon Transcript, supra note 181, at 58-63.
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from his aviation medical examiner, the first letter indicating
the FAA "was only interested in events like drug or alcohol re-
lated."1 85 The second letter indicated that while the physician
did not recall specifically discussing question 18V or 18W on the
medical application form, had such a discussion taken place, he
likely would have told the airman that the questions were only
related to drug or alcohol offenses."' In fact, the doctor wrote:
"It is quite possible that he generalized my comment to both
18V and 18W," and that, "a no answer to 18W may have been
based upon a misunderstanding created by our discussion."1 87
Judge Fowler found that the airman did not act with the intent
to defraud and overturned the FAA's emergency order of
revocation.18
The FAA appealed Judge Fowler's decision to the Board. 18
The Board employed several unfortunate techniques to over-
turn the decision of Judge Fowler. First of all, the Board ig-
nored binding precedent and ignored the fact that the FAA had
to prove the airman acted with the intent to deceive.o The
Board took the position that all the FAA had to prove was that
the statement was false, that it was material, and that the airman
knew it was false."' The Board then maintained that there was
no argument about the materiality of the answer on the form.1 2
In fact, the Board in a less than candid statement declared as
follows: "Moreover, respondent did not provide any case law or
arguments to indicate that the conviction was not material for
purposes of the intentional falsification standard . . . .""'
The foregoing statement by the Board is false. Consider the
following exchange that is in the record of the hearing:
MR. ARMSTRONG: Question 18W asks about convictions. And
question 18W asks about convictions to the extent that it might
reveal that you have a personality disorder, that you have psycho-
sis, that you're bipolar or that you're substance dependent.
That's why they ask specifically about cocaine and marijuana.
And if you have a conviction that deals with a medical issue, it is
185 Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937, at *6 (Oct. 28,
2008).
186 Id. at *6-7.
187 Id.
188 Id. at *9.
is Id. at *1.
190 Id. at *3-4.
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material. If you have a conviction that is not, it is immaterial. If
it is immaterial, you fail to satisfy one of the five elements of the
prima facie case.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FOWLER: What is your authority
that you're quoting now?
MR. ARMSTRONG: My authority is United States vs. Petullo, 709 F.2d
1178, Seventh Circuit, 1983. That's my authority. Those are the
five elements.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FOWLER: All right.
MR. ARMSTRONG: And they can't satisfy the third one because
whether this gentleman does or does not have a bribery convic-
tion is immaterial. It doesn't matter. It would not influence
their decision whether to issue or not issue a medical certificate.
If he had a conviction of DUI, they got a point. [sic] If he had a
conviction of possession of marijuana or cocaine, they've got a
point.
But a bribery conviction is not material under 67.303 of Part 67.
It's not material. And they can't win because they can't make out
the third element of a prima facie case of fraud. 194
It is ironic that in a case charging an airman with giving an
intentionally false statement on a medical application form the
Board would falsely state that Dillmon's counsel failed to argue
that the materiality of the false statement had not been raised at
the hearing in view of the foregoing excerpts from the hearing
transcript. Contrary to longstanding case law that the FAA must
prove the airman acted with the intent to deceive,' the Board
declared: "We find that the law judge erred in concluding that
respondent's failure to include his conviction on his medical ap-
plications due to his confusion concerning question 18W did
not constitute intentional falsification."196
Even though there is extensive case law which the Board has
adopted declaring that it will not interfere with the findings of
fact made by the Administrative Law Judge unless they are
clearly erroneous,"' the Board substituted its assessment of the
194 Dillmon Transcript, supra note 181, at 29.
195 See Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).
196 Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937, at *4 (Oct. 28,
2008).
197 See Taylor, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4509, 1996 WL 738720, at *3 (Dec. 11,
1996) ("Absent some compelling reason that persuades us that a lawjudge's cred-
ibility determination is inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence, we will not disturb his findings."); Rivera, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4419,
1996 WL 41224, at *2 (Jan. 19, 1996) (finding that in order to overturn the credi-
bility findings of a law judge, they must be arbitrary, inherently incredible, or
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evidence for that of Judge Fowler."' By ignoring the record
challenging the materiality of the questions on the form, by sub-
stituting its assessment of the evidence for the assessment made
by Judge Fowler, and by eliminating the need of the FAA to
prove that the airman acted with the intent to deceive, the
Board overturned the decision ofJudge Fowler and affirmed the
emergency order of revocation.'"
F. THE WEDDING CASE
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the
Board had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by fail-
ing to give deference to a credibility determination made by Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Mullins in the case of Wedding v.
NTSB. 20 0 The facts are that Mr. Wedding was hired to install a
new global positioning satellite (GPS) system into a Beech Bo-
nanza.201 The matter was tried before Judge Mullins and there
was evidence that the FAA inspector who would have approved
the installation by issuing an FAA Form 337 made a statement
before trial in which he declared that he did not know whether or
not he had given such approval.202 However, during the hear-
ing, the Agency inspector maintained that he was certain he did
not give approval for this particular aircraft.os The FAA called a
document examiner who testified that the inspector's signature
on the FAA Form 337 was a forgery.204 There was testimony in
the record to the effect that these kinds of matters were rou-
tinely handled by facsimile transmissions between the inspector
and the airman.205 Given the state of the evidence in the re-
cord, Judge Mullins made a credibility assessment that the FAA
had failed to carry its burden of proof, noting:
clearly erroneous); Stewart, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4387, 1995 WL 461591, at * 3
(July 28, 1995) (holding that lawjudge's findings not reversed unless clearly erro-
neous); Blossom, 7 N.T.S.B. 76, 77 (1990) (requiring Board to give deference to
law judge's findings of fact unless "inherently incredible or inconsistent with the
overwhelming weight of the evidence").
198 Dillmon, 2008 WL 4771937, at *3.
199 Id. at *3-5.
200 No. 02-73893, 2004 WL 958049 (9th Cir. May 3, 2004).
201 Wedding, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4994, 2002 WL 31051232, at *1 (Sept. 11,
2002).
202 Id. at *1-2.
203 Id. at *2.
204 Id.
205 Id. at *9.
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Let me talk about first a preponderance of the evidence. In
this case the Administrator is required under rule, NTSB rule to
establish the evidence of these violations by a preponderance of
the evidence. And in that regard the central case on intentional
falsification is the Hart vs. McLucas case. And in Hart vs. McLucas
for intentional falsification it is required 1) that the evidence es-
tablish that there was a false representation and 2) that this false
representation related to a material fact and that 3) it was made
by the person alleged to have made intentional falsification with
knowledge that it was false. And that knowledge, or as the Hart
vs. McLucas case said, referred to it as scienter, but in very spe-
cific lay terms the Administrator is required to show that the per-
son alleged to have made the statement lied, that that person is a
liar, that they lied when they signed this document, they knew it
was a lie and they deliberately lied to cover up a material fact.
Now, in this regard in the Circuit Court in Hart vs. McLucas
and then the Board on remand stated that on the question of
circumstantial evidence that circumstantial evidence in these
cases must be so compelling that no other determination is rea-
sonably possible. That's the burden of proof that I am looking
at.206
Judge Mullins then noted that fifteen days prior to the issu-
ance of the emergency order of revocation revoking the air-
man's certificates of Mr. Wedding, the FAA inspector who
brought the charges admitted that he might have approved the
installation of the GPS in this aircraft, but "he just didn't re-
member."2 0 7 Judge Mullins had before him a very serious case
in which an airman had been stripped of his certificates by the
FAA on an emergency basis, but the inspector who brought the
charges did not remember whether he approved the installation
in the aircraft or not. Because of the heavy burden of proof
borne by the FAA, Judge Mullins reversed the emergency order
of revocation noting: "So Mr. Lutz's testimony because of these
variations down through the testimony has simply not convinced
me that the Administrator has established by a preponderance
of the evidence today a regulatory violation."20 8 The FAA ap-
pealed the initial decision of Judge Mullins to the Board, and
the Board maintained that Judge Mullins had failed to consider
the testimony of an expert witness, a document examiner
named Mr. Flynn. 20 9 The Board went on to declare that the
206 Id. at *8-9.
207 Id. at *9.
208 Id. at *10.
209 Id. at *2.
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findings of Judge Mullins "could not be reconciled with the
evidence." 2 10
Because the Board had reversed Judge Mullins and upheld
the FAA's emergency order of revocation, Mr. Wedding ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
granted Mr. Wedding's petition for review, and noted that the
Board failed to follow a body of case law indicating that it had
the obligation to defer to the credibility determinations made by
the ALJ unless they were proven to be "arbitrary, inherently in-
credible, or clearly erroneous, which is the applicable stan-
dard."2 1 1 The Ninth Circuit went on to declare:
The Board did not apply this deferential standard of review to
the ALJ's adverse credibility determination regarding Inspector
Lutz. To reverse the ALJ's determination, the Board would have
to find that the "great weight of the evidence" established that
Wedding, not Lutz, falsified the Form 337. It is not possible from
this record to say that the great weight of the evidence points to
either man, as it is at best inconclusive. Because the Board
abused its discretion in overturning the ALJ's credibility finding,
we grant the petition for review, reverse the Board's decision,
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 212
After the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board, the case was re-
manded for further proceedings, and the Board declared in its
opinion and order on remand as follows:
There seems to be little doubt that someone falsified official FAA
documents in this case. Although in our decision we had no dif-
ficulty determining who had done so, the court found that it is
impossible to determine on this record whether Inspector Lutz
or respondent made those alterations. In light of its holding,
and the lack of any argument from the FAA that further proceed-
ings would produce any different result, we see no alternative but
to set aside the Administrator's order.2 1 3
G. THE ANDRZEJEWSKI CASE
A variation on a common theme of the NTSB abusing its dis-
cretion by failing to defer to the credibility assessments made by
210 Id.
211 Wedding v. NTSB, No. 02-73839, 2004 WL 958049, at *1 (9th Cir. May 3,
2004) (quoting Rivera, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4419, 1996 WL 41224, at *2 (Jan.
19, 1996).
212 Id.
213 Wedding, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5130, 2004 WL 3015188 (Dec. 21, 2004).
2010] 35
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
an ALJ is found in the case of Andrzejewski v. FAA.2 14 Andrzejew-
ski was a female aerobatic pilot who was showing her new air-
craft to her family at the Butler County Airport in Butler,
Pennsylvania.1 She was observed by an FAA safety inspector
and also the chief pilot of an aircraft operator.2 1 6 According to
their testimony, Andrzejewski departed the airport in a steep an-
gle of climb, they then saw the aircraft do a wing wag, make a
steep bank returning to the runway, and then pitch up before
departing the airport.2 1 7 The FAA concluded that Andrzejewski
had performed aerobatic maneuvers during takeoff in violation
of the FAR,218 and the FAA brought an emergency order of revo-
cation of Andrzejewski's certificate.2 19
In contrast to the FAA inspector and the other airman, An-
drzejewski presented three expert witnesses who testified that
while the FAA inspector and his companion saw what they saw,
the fact is that these operations for this kind of aircraft were
quite normal in light of its extraordinary performance capabili-
ties. 2 20 They further maintained there was nothing aerobatic
about the flight, since Andrzejewski declared that her low pass
was intended to be a landing but she went around due to a
tailwind."'
The ALJ who tried the case found that the testimony of An-
drzejewski's witnesses was more credible than those of the FAA
and reversed the emergency order of revocation.22 The FAA
appealed to the NTSB, which reversed the ALJ, reinstating the
emergency order of revocation.2 2 3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in noting the applicable
standard of review, declared it would set aside the NTSB's deci-
sion if it was found to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of
discretion noting that if the NTSB fails to follow its own prece-
dent, then the decision is arbitrary and capricious.2 2 4 The Ninth
Circuit went on to observe:
214 548 F.3d. 1257 (9th Cir. 2008).
215 Id. at 1258.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1259-60.
218 14 C.F.R. § 91.303(e) (2009).
219 Andrzejewski, 548 F.3d at 1259.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1258-59.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 1260 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (a); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1973)).
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Where an ALJ chooses to credit one set of witnesses' version of
events over another, he has made an implicit credibility determi-
nation to which the NTSB must defer "in the absence of any arbi-
trariness, capriciousness or other compelling reasons." The
NTSB must leave undisturbed an ALJ's credibility finding "unless
there is a compelling reason or the finding was clearly
erroneous." 225
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Board had substituted its
opinion of the evidence for the evidentiary findings and credi-
bility assessments made by the ALJ and remanded the case for
further proceedings to allow the Board to decide whether the
ALJ's credibility finding was "clearly erroneous."2 2 6 As was the
case in Wedding, the Ninth Circuit in Andzejewski declared that
the Board may not, without legitimate reason, refuse to defer to
the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the
ALJ. 227
H. THE RICE DECISIONS
There are two Board decisions concerning an airman named
Rice, the first being an NTSB decision granting the airman's ap-
peal as to sanction,2 2 8 and the second being a Board decision
denying the application of Rice for an award of attorney's fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.22 ' The FAA's interests in
Mr. Rice began with an order suspending his airline transport
pilot certificate for ninety days following an off-airport landing
due to fuel exhaustion.23 o Initially, the FAA alleged four sepa-
rate violations: (1) flying an aircraft without a current medical
certificate contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 61.3; (2) operating an aircraft
in a careless or reckless manner contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a);
(3) operating an aircraft without the required reserve fuel for a
flight in VFR conditions contrary to 14 C.F.R. § 91.151(b); and
(4) operating an aircraft contrary to the limitations contained in
the Aircraft Flight Manual in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.9(a).'
The Administrator then issued an amended order withdrawing
the charge of a violation of operating the aircraft contrary to the
flight manual limitations but without making any reduction in
225 Id. at 1260 (internal citations omitted).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Rice, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5408, 2008 WL 4452143 (Sept. 29, 2008).
229 In re Rice, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5474, 2009 WL 2844146 (Aug. 26, 2009).
230 Rice, 2008 WL 4452143, at *1.
231 Id. at *4 nn.2-3.
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the proposed sanction.2 3 2 Following an evidentiary hearing,
Judge Mullins reduced the sanction to a seventy-five day suspen-
sion from which the airman appealed.
The FAA did not attempt to introduce into evidence the sanc-
tion guidance table,2 3 4 and the Board, in addressing the air-
man's assertion that the seventy-five day suspension was arbitrary
and not in accordance with Board precedent235 and the Board
in addressing this issue declared:
First, we note that the Administrator did not introduce the sanc-
tion guidance table into evidence at the hearing, or otherwise
provide convincing evidence of the rationale for the choice of
sanction. Moreover, we note that the range of sanction appears
to be between 30 and 60 days for fuel exhaustion cases, where
there are no aggravating circumstances such as an unfavorable
compliance disposition or a history of prior violations.13 6
The Board went on to declare:
The law judge's sanction determination is owed no deference,
for it provides no substantive explanation for how it was calcu-
lated. Finally, even on appeal, the Administrator provides no
meaningful explanation of what range his sanction guidance ta-
ble specifies for the violations at issue in this case, or, impor-
tantly, an explanation about how the facts of this case should be
analyzed within the range of possible sanctions.2 3 7
Next, the Board made a remark that can only be interpreted
as exhibiting a bias in favor of the FAA, and certainly not the
kind of remark one would read in an appellate decision of a
court, when the Board wrote:
In future cases, we encourage the Administrator to present evi-
dence of the sanction guidance table, and evidence or argument
addressed to the validity of choice of sanctions in the context of
the specific facts of each case. In the absence of such a record,
we cannot defer to the Administrator's sanction for we have no
way to assess its validity."
232 Id. at *4 n.3.
2-3 Id. at *1.




238 Id. at *4 n.11 (emphasis added).
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The Board then granted the airman's appeal, imposed a sixty
day suspension, and modified the initial decision of Judge Mul-
lins accordingly.23 9
Rice then made claim for attorney's fees on the basis that the
actions of the FAA were not substantially justified. 24 0 Rice as-
serted that the FAA had waited one hundred and twenty-seven
days after issuing the original order of suspension and twelve
days after counsel for Rice had deposed two FAA inspectors
before the FAA withdrew the alleged violation of 14 C.F.R.§ 91.9(a) and that the FAA did not make a concomitant reduc-
tion in the suspension sought.24' Not only did Rice argue that
the FAA had abandoned one of the charges, but also that the
ultimate suspension imposed was sixty days as opposed to the
ninety days sought by the FAA.2 42 By virtue of the foregoing,
Rice maintained that he was the prevailing party in a discrete
portion of the case. 2 4 3 Rice went on to argue:
It is respectfully submitted that when, as here, the Board reduces
a sanction based upon the failure of the Administrator to provide
any analysis or evidence of the rationale for the choice of sanc-
tion, at both the hearing and on appeal to the Full Board, due
process and public policy dictate that the Applicant is the prevail-
ing party for purposes of EAJA.24 4
The statute which governed the petition of Rice to recover his
attorney's fees provided:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award,
to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other
expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceed-
ing, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the
position of the agency was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not that posi-
tion of the agency was substantially justified shall be determined
on the basis of the administrative record, as a whole, which is
made in the adversary adjudication for which fees and other ex-
penses are sought.245
239 Id. at *4.
240 See Appeal Brief of Applicant Patrick Sean Rice, In re Rice, N.T.S.B. Order
No. EA-5474, 2009 WL 2844146 (Aug. 26, 2009).
241 Id. at 3.
242 Id. at 4.
243 Id. at 5.
244 Id. at 9, 10.
245 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1) (2006).
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Rice went on to argue in his appeal brief to the Board from
denial of his application for attorney's fees24 6 as follows:
To establish "substantial justification" the Administrator must
show (1) that there is a reasonable basis in truth for the facts
alleged in the pleadings; (2) that there exists a reasonable basis
in law for the theory it propounds; and (3) that the facts alleged
will reasonably support the legal theory advanced. McCrary v. Ad-
ministrator, 5 NTSB 1235 (1986). The relevant inquiry is whether
the Administrator's case is "justified in substance or in the main
- that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable per-
son." Pierce v. Underwood, 87 U.S. 552 (1988). The court in Pierce
v. Underwood phrased this test as requiring a "reasonable basis in
both fact and law. Id.
Addressing the steps set forth above, it is clear the Administra-
tor was not substantially justified in issuing an order of suspen-
sion based on a violation of FAR 91.9 (a) (sic), because in pre-
hearing depositions, the Administrator's investigating Inspectors
did not articulate any reasonable basis in law and fact for the
violation. Then, and only then, did the Administrator withdraw
the violation.
Addressing the steps set forth above, it is clear the Administra-
tor was not substantially justified in imposing a ninety day suspen-
sion. There is no reasonable basis in law or fact for the
Administrator to have reasonably believed that a ninety day sus-
pension for the violations alleged was appropriate. Indeed, as
found by the Board, a ninety-day suspension is not supported by
precedent, is not supported by the sanction guidelines, and the
Administrator did not introduce anything into the record at any
stage of the proceedings which would justify a ninety day
suspension. "247
The Board, which had declared on no less than three occa-
sions that the FAA had failed to introduce the sanction guidance
table into evidence and which had "encouraged" the FAA "to
present evidence of the sanction guidance table" in its order of
September 29, 2008,248 then did an about face in its order af-
firming the denial of an award of attorney's fees to Rice. 2 4 9 With
246 See In re Rice, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5474, 2009 WL 2844146, at *4-7 (Aug.
26, 2009) (including the Order Denying Application for an Award of Attorneys
Fees).
247 Appeal Brief of Applicant Patrick Sean Rice at 10, In re Rice, N.T.S.B. Order
No. EA-5474, 2009 WL 2844146 (Aug. 26, 2009).
248 Rice, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5408, 2008 WL 4452143, at *4 n.11 (Sept. 29,
2008).
249 In re Rice, N.T.S.B. Order EA-5474, 2009 WL 2844146, at *3 (Aug. 26,
2009).
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regard to the argument of Rice that he had prevailed in a dis-
crete portion of the case by virtue of the FAA's abandoning one
of the charges before trial, the Board rejected this argument
claiming that Rice had not prevailed "on a significant and sub-
stantive portion of the proceeding."25 0 The Board even went so
far as to declare it was abandoning a body of law to the contrary,
by stating:
We expressly abandon our statement in Application of Whittington,
NTSB Order No. EA-5063 at 5 (2003), suggesting that a with-
drawn charge is, a fortiori, dispositive evidence that an applicant
prevailed as to that withdrawn charge. This assertion in Whitting-
ton, which did not affect the resolution of that case, was incorrect
in light of the relevant EAJA case law.2 51
The Board, rather than engage in a meaningful analysis or
explain why the FAA's abandonment of charges did not render
the airman the prevailing party, simply chose to abandon its pre-
vious declaration on the issue. 25 2
Next, with regard to the argument that the reduction in sanc-
tion would authorize an award of attorney's fees, the Board, in
direct contradiction to its earlier pronouncement that the FAA
should have tendered the sanction guidance table into evi-
dence, maintained: "we find that the Administrator was reasona-
ble in both fact and law in pursuing a 90-day suspension."2 5 3
Respectfully, it is impossible to reconcile the Board's pro-
nouncement of September 29, 2008, in Rice to the effect that the
FAA had not offered any evidence as to sanction and encourag-
ing the FAA in future litigation to place the sanction guidance
table into evidence, 2 54 with its decision denying Rice an award of
attorney's fees of August 26, 2009, in which it maintained that
the actions of the FAA, in pursuing a ninety day suspension with-
out any sanction guidance table to support that position, "was
reasonable in both fact and law."2 5 5
I. THE AAGRUDER DECISIONS
Our inquiry into the conduct of the Board once again entails
examining two distinct Board decisions, the first being an initial
250 Id. at *3.
251 Id. at *3 n.9.
252 Id.
253 Id. at *3.
254 Rice, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5408, 2008 WL 4452143, at *4 n.11 (Sept. 29,
2008).
255 In re Rice, 2009 WL 2844146, at *3.
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decision where the airman prevailed in charges arising from an
off-airport landing of an aircraft due to fuel exhaustion because
the airman was not the pilot-in-command of the aircraft,2 5 6 and
the second being the Board's opinion and order affirming a de-
nial of an award of attorney's fees to Magruder.2 5 7 Magruder
was a member of the Albert Whitted Flying Club. 58 Members of
the flying club paid an initiation fee, and the flying club was
open to both pilots and non-pilots. 259 Members of the club who
were qualified pilots could rent aircraft and those who were not
pilots could rent an aircraft if a flight instructor was on board.2 6 0
Edwin Good was another member of the club who held a private
pilot's certificate but did not have a medical certificate.2 6' Bay
Area Flying Service, which ran the flying club, offered a Florida
Keys day trip involving three aircraft that would depart in the
morning of July 10, 2004, fly to Key West, and return in the af-
ternoon.2 6 2 Magruder signed up for the flying club event as did
Mr. Good.2 63 According to the testimony of Mr. Good, he was
assigned to the same aircraft as Magruder and Magruder's
wife. 26' According to Good, he told Magruder he would like to
fly the first leg and that Magruder would handle the radios, but
they did not discuss who would be the pilot-in-command, and
Good maintained he did not even know what that term
meant.26 5 Good testified he never considered who would be in
charge of the flight. 2 6 6 Good further maintained that he told
Magruder before they left that he (Good) did not have a medi-
cal certificate because he had diabetes.2 6 7
After departing from the Albert Whitted Airport, Good testi-
fied that Magruder operated the radios and was navigating. 68
Good testified that he heard someone over the radio say they
were cleared to land, and the aircraft landed at Homestead Air
256 Magruder, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-17273, 2005 WL 3688604 (Nov. 7, 2005).
257 In re Magruder, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5278, 2007 WL 1233535 (Apr. 10,
2007).
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Reserve Base. 26 9 The aircraft was met by armed military person-
nel and Good and Mr. and Mrs. Magruder were taken to a build-
ing to complete some forms. 27 0 Good executed a military R-10
flight plan form declaring the aircraft was departing Homestead
Air Reserve Base en route to Marathon, Florida.2 7 ' Good fur-
ther testified he did not know who had crossed out Marathon as
the destination and entered Key West as the destination on the
military flight plan.2 7 2
Prior to departing Homestead, Good asked about fuel, but
was told there was none, and he did not measure the fuel
aboard the aircraft.273 On the departure from Homestead,
Good sat in the left seat while Magruder sat in the right seat with
Mrs. Magruder in the rear seat.2 74 Good testified that after they
departed Homestead, he did everything and did not ask Magru-
der to do anything.275 After Good departed Homestead, he re-
ceived directions from the control tower to Highway 1.276
During the flight, the engine began to run rough and then
stopped, and the aircraft landed on a highway. When the air-
craft was met by the Sheriff, Mr. Good told the Sheriff that he
was the pilot.277
The FAA issued an order revoking Good's airman's certificate
in which it was asserted that Good was the pilot-in-command of
the aircraft in question for the flight from the Albert Whitted
Airport to Homestead Air Reserve Base.2 78 The FAA then issued
an order suspending the airman's certificate of Magruder for
one hundred eighty days maintaining he was the pilot-in-com-
mand of the aircraft on the date in question and charging him
with careless or reckless conduct, inadequate pre-flight plan-












279 Id. at *2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2009) (dealing with careless or reck-
less conduct), 14 C.F.R. § 91.103(a) (2009) (dealing with preflight planning obli-
gations of the pilot-in-command), 14 C.F.R. § 91.151(a) (1) (2009) (dealing with
the fuel requirements for a VFR flight).
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The FAA allegations were tried before Judge Pope, who ad-
mitted into evidence the order revoking Good's airman's certifi-
cate. 280 The FAA attempted to place into evidence a letter on
the letterhead of Magruder that was unsigned, but the letter was
not received into evidence because no adequate foundation was
laid for its admission.
The FAA's investigative file was placed into evidence and
Agency Inspector Frank testified there was nothing in the file
showing an explicit designation of Magruder as the pilot-in-com-
mand." FAA Inspector Frank admitted that there was only an
implicit designation of Magruder as pilot-in-command when
Good told Magruder that Good did not have a valid medical
certificate.2 8 1 On cross-examination, Inspector Frank authenti-
cated an exhibit, which was an interpretation by the Assistant
Chief Counsel of the FAA, which said that "anyone can act as
pilot-in-command without being qualified."28 4 The same FAA
interpretation said that who is pilot-in-command is a question of
fact and must be determined in light of all the circumstances in
a particular situation, not just the ratings of the pilots in-
volved.2 8 5 Inspector Frank maintained that if Mr. Good acted as
pilot-in-command, it would be a violation of the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations, since he was not medically qualified.2 8 6
Mter considering the evidence, Judge Pope rendered his find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law noting that the FAR defined
the "pilot-in-command as the person who: (1) has the final au-
thority and responsibility for the operation of a flight, (2) has
been designated as pilot-in-command before or during the
flight, and (3) holds the appropriate category, class and type rat-
ing, if appropriate for the conduct of the flight."28 7 Taking note
of NTSB precedent, Judge Pope observed that the mere fact that
an unlicensed airman ascertains that someone else on the flight
possesses a valid certificate does not render the licensed person
the pilot-in-command.8
280 Magruder, 2005 WL 3688604, at *1, *5.
281 Id. at *5.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at *6.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. (referencing 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 and the definition of pilot-in-command).
288 Id. at 7 (citing Cooper, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4433 (Feb. 22, 1996).
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Judge Pope found that Mr. Good told Air Force security per-
sonnel he was the pilot of the aircraft and put his name on a
form as the pilot-in-command.28 9 Further, Judge Pope noted
that after the emergency landing, Mr. Good told deputy sheriffs
he was the pilot of the aircraft.2 9 0 In reaching his combined le-
gal and factual conclusion about whether Magruder was the pi-
lot-in-command, the only concern of Judge Pope was whether
the status of Magruder changed after the aircraft departed
Homestead Air Reserve Base.2 9 1
With regard to the concern of Judge Pope, he declared: "The
plain fact is that nothing happened at Homestead Air Reserve
Base after Mr. Good made his unauthorized landing there to
change Mr. Good's status from pilot-in-command to something
less, and to elevate respondent to pilot-in-command."2 9 2 Judge
Pope reasoned that upon the aircraft being landed at Home-
stead Air Reserve Base, Mr. Magruder "made every effort to
make himself as inconspicuous as possible, and not attract atten-
tion to himself . .. and was perfectly content to let Mr. Good
deal with the problem of getting [the aircraft] released from
police custody so [the flight] could continue ....
In describing the conduct of Magruder, Judge Pope observed:
"In short, it appears to be a fair inference that he played the role
of an air passenger, in no way responsible for the operation of
the aircraft."2 9 4
In finding for Magruder and against the FAA, Judge Pope
made the following declarations:
The mere presence on board the flight of someone who could
lawfully exercise the privileges and responsibility of a pilot-in-
command does not make that person the pilot-in-command.
Someone cannot be considered the pilot-in-command by default.
It is not an involuntary act.
To be considered to be a pilot-in-command, and therefore, re-
sponsible for the safe operation of a flight, a very weighty respon-
sibility, there must be actual or at least implied acceptance of
that responsibility.
In other words, to be pilot-in-command, an otherwise qualified
pilot must at least, by his actions, if not by explicit agreement or
289 Id. at *7




294 Id. at *9.
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designation, demonstrate that he is accepting overall responsibil-
ity for and control of the flight.
Nowhere in the evidence in this case is there any evidence that
the Respondent was ever designated to be pilot-in-command, or
that he agreed to, or by his actions demonstrated that he was
stepping into accepting the role of pilot-in-command and taking
over all responsibility for and control of the flight.
I find, therefore, that the Administrator has not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent was the pi-
lot-in-command of the flight charged in the Complaint. The evi-
dence clearly indicates Mr. Good was the pilot-in-command with
ultimate responsibility and in full control of the flight, and at no
time showed an inclination, desire, or intention in relinquishing
that control.
Since the Respondent was not the pilot-in-command and was
not operating the controls of the aircraft, he had no responsibil-
ity for complying with the requirements imposed by section
91.103(a) and section 91.151 (a) (1) of the FARs.
Further, there is no evidence showing that he violated Section
91.13(a) of the FARs by operating an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.2 95
In light of the remarkably forceful pronouncements by Judge
Pope, one would anticipate that Magruder could recover attor-
ney's fees from the FAA on the basis that the claims against him
were not substantially justified in both law and fact.296 In fact,
Magruder did make application for attorney's fees in the
amount of $23,559.50,297 arguing in essence that the legal pre-
mise of the FAA's case was flawed in that merely because Magru-
der was aboard the aircraft and discovered that Good did not
have a medical certificate did not, as a matter of law, render
Magruder the pilot-in-command.
In Judge Pope's initial decision, which is appended to the
Board's opinion and order, Judge Pope relied upon hearsay
sponsored by the FAA as to what an asterisk by Magruder's name
meant when the court noted: "There was at least hearsay evi-
dence that the asterisk designated the pilot-in-command." 2 9 9 In
295 Id.
296 See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1) (2006); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
552-53 (1988); McCrary, 5 N.T.S.B. 1235, 1237 (1986).
297 In re Magruder, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5278, 2007 WL 123535, at *6 (Apr.
10, 2007).
298 Id. at *3-4.
299 Id. at *11.
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denying Magruder's application for attorney's fees, Judge Pope
wrote:
The issue is not whether the Administrator was able to prove the
meaning of the asterisk at the hearing, which she was not, but
whether the Administrator had enough evidence to justify pro-
ceeding with the case to a hearing. The meaning of the asterisk
and the denials by both the Applicant and Mr. Good that they
were the pilot-in-command created factual and credibility issues
that could only be resolved at a hearing.soo
Besides relying upon hearsay about what the asterisk by Ma-
gruder's name meant on a document, Judge Pope also consid-
ered the letter he had excluded from evidence, noting:
Although the letter was offered into evidence by the Administra-
tor at the hearing, but was not accepted, the Administrator ar-
gues that she was entitled to use the letter as a basis for her
conclusion that the Applicant was the pilot-in-command of the
flight when it left Homestead Air Reserve Base, because he knew
that Mr. Good could not serve as the pilot-in-command. 0 '
While Judge Pope maintained that these credibility issues
made the conduct of the FAA substantially justified, Magruder
noted that "the case was decided solely on the evidence and tes-
timony presented during the Administrator's case-in-chief, and,
therefore, there were no issues of credibility. Therefore, the Ad-
ministrator's position was not justified."3 0 2
The Board affirmed the denial of an application for attorney's
fees noting that the asterisk on an exhibit and the unauthenti-
cated letter that was not received into evidence were bases for
finding that the actions of the FAA were substantially justified.0 3
To the extent the Board was relying upon evidence that was not
received upon the trial in chief, the Board declared:
The law judge did not allow the letter to be admitted into evi-
dence, however, due to its questionable authenticity. We ac-
knowledge that the authenticity of this evidence is debatable,
but, although applicant argues it was error for the law judge to
use the letter as a basis for denial of EAJA fees because it was not
in evidence, we have considered it as part of the entire adminis-
trative record in order to determine whether the Administrator
was substantially justified in pursuing the enforcement action.3 0 4
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at *10.
303 Id. at *3, *5.
34 Id. at *5.
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The conduct of the Board in Magruder is disturbing for at least
two reasons. First and foremost, in the initial decision, the pro-
nouncement was unambiguous that the mere fact that Magru-
der was aboard the aircraft did not render him pilot-in-
command even if he discovered that Mr. Good did not have a
current medical certificate since assuming the authority of pilot-
in-command "is not an involuntary act."o3 5 Moreover, a finding
had been made in the initial decision "that nothing happened at
Homestead Air Reserve Base after Mr. Good made his unautho-
rized landing there to change Mr. Good's status from pilot-in-
command to something less, and to elevate the Respondent to
pilot-in-command." 0 6 Respectfully, the finding that Magruder
was not the pilot-in-command in light of this unambiguous lan-
guage appears to be inconsistent with the denial of his applica-
tion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Secondly, the fact that hearsay sponsored by the FAA, as to what
the asterisk meant by Magruder's name, coupled with the letter
attributed to Magruder, which was never admitted into evi-
dence, were employed to make a finding that the actions of the
FAA were substantially justified is disturbing and demonstrates
the need for rules of evidence and rules of procedure so that
materials that are not admissible into evidence cannot come in
through the back door to deny an airman an award of attorney's
fees.
IV. DISCOVERY BEFORE THE BOARD - AN EXERCISE
IN FUTILITY
In Murphy, the matter came on for hearing on November 14,
2006.'0 Counsel for respondents filed a motion in limine to
preclude the FAA from entering evidence into the record incon-
sistent with its admissions in judicio and argued, "If those admis-
sions are admitted, there is no case. The case is over."308
Respondents' counsel requested that he be permitted to read
the thirty-five paragraphs of the requests for admissions into the
record."
305 Magruder, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-17273, 2005 WL 3688604, at *9 (Nov. 7,
2005).
306 Id. at *8.
307 Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. 5355, 2008 WL 205095 (Jan. 16, 2008).
08 Tr. of Evidentiary Hearing at 23, Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. 5355, 2008
WL 205095 (Jan. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Murphy Transcript].
309 Id.
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Agency counsel admitted that no response or objection to the
requests for admissions had ever been served.o10 The following
exchange between the court and Agency counsel then ensued:
JUDGE POPE: Obviously they wanted you to answer them. Other-
wise, they wouldn't have filed them.
MR. EuLis: Obviously, your Honor, but there are rules when it
comes to discovery. When it comes to the other side not doing
something you want to do, you have to file a motion to compel.
We would have happily done that. This was done back in March,
and there's been no mention of it since Monday (sic). We move
that they be deemed waived for failure to prosecute these, and
the rules in the NTSB proceedings aren't like the Federal Rules.
They don't mandate that admissions have to be admitted after a
certain number of time (sic).
JUDGE POPE: Well, we're not playing games here. The motion
was filed, a request for admissions. Apparently, the Administra-
tor, for whatever reason, decided not to answer it, or if they did
object to it, they never directly answered the questions, so -
MR. ELUis: This is a surprise to us, your Honor -
JUDGE POPE: -my ruling at the moment is, sir, we will go off the
record, and you will answer each of the request for admissions.
MR. ELis: Okay."'
The effect of the FAA's failure to respond to the requests for
admission under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was such
that the factual content of the requests were conclusively
deemed admitted.3 1 2
When the court instructed Agency counsel to respond in the
courtroom to the requests for admission, respondent's counsel
took exception noting:
MR. ARMSTRONG: I want to make a record, your Honor. I think
the Court's ruling is in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. I think it violates 5 U.S.C. § 556. I think it's
contrary to Rule 36 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I
think that ruling is erroneous, and I want the record to reflect
that, your Honor. He is bound by the admissions in judicio. The
case is over.
JUDGE POPE: Well, you can certainly take that up with the Board,
however -
MR. ARMSTRONG: I Will.
31o Id. at 25.
31" Id. at 26, 27.
312 See FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).
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MR. ARMSTRONG: Respectfully, the morning of trial is not the
time for the Agency to be responding to requests for admissions.
That's not fair. It violates the Fifth Amendment. 13
To the extent the Board's Rules of Practice make reference to
the concept of discovery, Board Rule 19(c) provides:
Use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that pertain to depositions and
discovery may be used as a general guide for discovery practice in
proceedings before the Board where appropriate. The Federal
Rules and the case law that constitutes them shall be considered
by the Board and its law judges as instructive rather than
controlling. 14
The notion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "may be
used as a general guide for discovery practice""' does not com-
port with the directive ofJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "l[T] he
tendency of the law must always be to narrow the field of uncer-
tainty."" 6 The Board's Rules of Practice do just the opposite,
since rules understood by practitioners along with the body of
case law are merely "instructive, rather than controlling. "317
In Dillmon, the Administrator brought an emergency action to
revoke the airman's certificate on the theory that he had given a
false response to question 18W on the medical application form
to the extent that he had not disclosed a bribery conviction.
Among the defenses set up by Dillmon in his answer was the
assertion that "the convictions about which the FAA complains
are immaterial. Whether or not respondent had a conviction of
bribery is immaterial to his physical fitness to operate an air-
craft." 20 As his third defense, Dillmon maintained: "Question
18W on the FAA medical application form which appears in the
context of questions about health and medical history is void for
vagueness, constitutionally infirm and violates respondent's
right to substantive due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."3 2 1
313 Murphy Transcript, supra note 308, at 28-29.
314 49 C.F.R. § 821.19(c) (2008).
315 Id.
316 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
317 49 C.F.R. § 821.19(c) (2008).
318 See Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937, at *1 (Oct. 28,
2008).
319 See Answer of Resp't at 2, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 5,
2008).
320 Id. at 2.
321 Id.
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In light of his defenses, Dillmon propounded discovery re-
quests to the Administrator, 3 2 2 in which respondent requested
that the Administrator produce, among other things: "[a] Mem-
orandum from Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administrator
for Aviation Standards (AVS-1) to Assistant Inspector General
(JI-1) February 17, 1987. .. "2 The Administrator objected to
producing the Broderick Memorandum, asserting: "Objection.
The information sought is irrelevant, and unlikely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." 3 2
Dillmon moved to compel discovery, or in the alternative, for
sanctions based upon the Administrator's refusal to produce the
Broderick Memorandum.3 2' The court entered an order deny-
ing Dillmon's efforts to secure the Broderick Memorandum and
other materials of an exculpatory nature.3 26 Among the com-
ments made in the Broderick Memorandum were as follows:
We also need to think about changing the form and substance of
the questions asked on the Form 8500-8 as we discussed. It has
not generally been possible to successfully prosecute people in
the past in part because of the vague, qualitative, and evaluative
nature of these questions. As you know, dozens of such cases
were returned to us as declined for prosecution a few years ago.
We would be pleased to receive any suggestions you have for im-
provement in this area.2
The efforts of the respondent to secure discovery did not end
with pursuit of the Broderick Memorandum but also included
efforts to secure all FAA memoranda concerning placing any
questions on the medical application form about criminal con-
victions;1" memoranda, hand written notations, emails, and in-
ternal correspondence discussing inserting question 18w on the
322 Respondent's Disc. to the FAA, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349
(Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Respondent's Discovery Requests].
323 Id. at 4.
324 Acting Administrator's Resp. to Respondent's First Req. for Disc. at 4,
Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 15, 2008).
325 Mot. to Compel, or in the Alternative, Mot. for Sanctions, Dillmon, N.T.S.B.
Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 17, 2008).
326 Order Den. Respondent's Mot. to Compel, or in the Alternative, Mot. for
Sanctions, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 23, 2008).
327 Mem. from Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administrator for Aviation
Standards (AVS-1) to Assistant Inspector General for Investigations (I-1) (Feb.
17, 1987); see also Alan Armstrong, Defending False Statement Charges Relating to the
FAA's Medical Application Form, 57 J. AIR L. & COM., 357, 360 (1991).
328 Respondent's Second Disc. to the FAA at 2, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No.
SE-18349 (Sept. 9, 2008).
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medical application form;329 the identity of all FAA employees
who participated in the formulation and creation of the medical
application form and any previous versions of the form;330 the
names of all FAA personnel who decided to include question
18w on the medical application form;33 1 and the identity of each
medical treatise authorizing the placement of question 18W on
the medical application form.3 3 2
The Administrator refused to produce any materials in re-
sponse to the respondent's expanded discovery requests inton-
ing "that the information sought is irrelevant and not likely to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."3 3 3 Respondent
filed a second motion to compel discovery,33 4 to which the FAA
responded,3 and at the time of the hearing in the matter, re-
spondent's counsel complained on the record to Judge Fowler
about the fact that the FAA had not produced any material in
response to the respondent's second discovery requests.3
Counsel argued that the proceedings before the court
presented a constitutional issue that could not be avoided,3
and when the court refused to grant the respondent's second
motion to compel discovery, Dillmon's counsel took exception
to that rule.3 Curiously, even though the discussion above
demonstrates that the Administrator refused to produce the
Broderick Memorandum in response to discovery,3 the court
admitted the Broderick Memorandum into evidence over objec-
tion by the Administrator.4 o Similarly, even though the FAA
had not produced any materials in response to Dillmon's discov-
ery requests, the court admitted, over objection, a host of mater-
ials demonstrating that question 18W on the medical
9 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 3.
332 Id.
333 Administrator's Resp. to Respondent's Second Req. for Disc., at 1-3,
Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 19, 2008).
34 Respondent's Second Mot. to Compel, or in the Alternative, Mot. for Sanc-
tions, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 24, 2008).
3 Administrator's Resp. to Respondent's Second Mot. to Compel, or in the
Alternative, Mot. for Sanctions, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 25,
2008).
336 Dillmon Transcript, supra note 181, at 12.
7 Id. at 8.
338 Id. at 14.
339 Acting Administrator's Resp. to Respondent's First Req. for Disc. at 4,
Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 15, 2008).
340 Dillmon Transcript, supra note 181, at 99.
2010] CALL FOR A CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 53
application form was ambiguous and constitutionally infirm."'
If, as the Administrator maintained, these and other documents
were not "relevant" for purposes of discovery, 4 2 and if the court
ruled properly in denying production of these materials,34 3 then
why were they admitted into evidence over the Administrator's
objection?3" It is axiomatic that had these materials been
sought in federal court, where the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are enforced, they would have been produced, or the Ad-
ministrator would have been sanctioned for refusing to produce
the materials. 4
The exchange between counsel and the court in Shaffe? 46 un-
derscores the difficulty imposed upon counsel for the airman in
the event the FAA is not fully compliant with discovery requests
in an emergency proceeding. Shaffer had sought "all radar data
showing the location of N3050H on 30 May 2006,""34 but the
radar data produced by the FAA terminated before the time the
aircraft was on its return leg to Homestead, Florida. Shaffer's
counsel objected to the non-production because, according to
341 Id. at 111, 112, 113, 114, 115 (admitting into evidence Indictment, United
States v. Pamela M. Manapat, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Flor-
ida, Tampa Division, Case No. 88-325-CR-T-13(A)); Respondent's exhibit 10, Mo-
tion to Dismiss of Defendant, United States v. Pamela M. Manapat, U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 88-325-CR-T-
13 (A); Respondent's exhibit 11, Transcript of Proceedings before Judge George
C. Carr, United States v. Pamela M. Manapat, U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 88-325-CR-T-13 (A) (December 8,
1998); Respondent's exhibit 12, Order by Judge George C. Carr, United States
District Judge, United States v. Pamela M. Manapat, U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 88-325-CR-T-13 (A); Respon-
dent's exhibit 13, letter from Michael J. Pangia, Esq., President, National Trans-
portation Safety Board Bar Association to John Jordan, M.D., Federal Air
Surgeon, Federal Aviation Administration, AAM-1, October 3, 1989; Respon-
dent's exhibit 14, letter from Bernard A. Geier, Executive Director, National As-
sociation of Flight Instructors, February 16, 1990; and Respondent's exhibit 15,
letter from Federal Air Surgeon, Robert R. McMeekin, M.D. to Bernard A. Geier,
March 1, 1990.
342 Acting Administrator's Resp. to Respondent's First Req. for Disc. at 5-6,
Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 15, 2008).
34 Order Den. Respondent's Mot. to Compel, or in the Alternative, Mot. for
Sanctions, Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349 (Sept. 23, 2008).
344 Dillmon Transcript, supra note 181, at 111-15.
34 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) ("Unless otherwise limited by court order, the
scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-
privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. . . .").
346 Tr. of Proceedings in Shaffer, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-17764 (July 21,
2006), [hereinafter Shaffer Transcript].
347 Id. at 723.
34 Id. at 699.
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the airman's counsel, an FAA air traffic controller was allowed to
testify that he observed the aircraft of the airman on radar for
the entire flight, up to the point that it landed.4 9 The airman's
lawyer maintained that, since he had requested the radar data
and it had not been produced before trial, the testimony of the
air traffic controller be suppressed and stricken "for anything
which occurred after the point at which the radar data supplied
to us ended."3 50
In an effort to mitigate the non-production of the requested
radar data, the court ordered the FAA to produce the material
before the close of proceedings on Friday, July 21, 2006, in or-
der that counsel for the airman would have the weekend to eval-
uate the data and prepare his defense.' In issuing this
directive, the court noted that there are "a lot of problems with
discovery in emergency cases." 5 2 However, the problem with
the court's solution to the non-production of the requested ma-
terial was that the airman's expert witness in air traffic control
matters would not be available to testify on the following Mon-
day, when the trial would recommence.5 The ALJ would not
consider dismissing the charges brought by the FAA on grounds
that the radar data had not timely been produced, noting: "I just
don't see any other way that I can deal with this, other than to
dismiss the case summarily and I don't think that the public in-
terest and safety in air operation is served by doing that."3 5 4
V. WHY HAS THE BOARD CEASED TO
FUNCTION FAIRLY?
Some insight into the functions of the Board has been se-
cured from John Goglia, a former member of the NTSB. 55 In
interviewing Mr. Goglia, it is his assessment that the erosion in
the quality of Board decisions began before he assumed his du-
ties as a member of the Board in 1995.6 Presently, staff attor-
neys do not even give members of the Board the trial transcripts
or exhibits when the opinion and order are generated. 5 If a
34 Id. at 697.
350 Id. at 698.
351 Id. at 711.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 720, 721.
854 Id. at 714.
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member of the Board wants to see a trial transcript or view ex-
hibits, he or she must ask for them.' When Mr. Goglia was on
the Board and he requested transcripts or exhibits, he felt that
he was troubling the staff in making those requests.5 9 When
Mr. Goglia served on the NTSB, he wanted all of the data to
evaluate the merits of the relative positions of the parties.36 0
According to the understanding of Mr. Goglia, before he as-
sumed his duties at the NTSB, there were two opinions written
by the staff attorneys, one affirming the decision of the adminis-
trative law judge and one reversing the decision. 6 1 Presently,
according to Mr. Goglia's understanding, the staff attorneys at
the NTSB write only one opinion. 6 2 The members of the Board
then decide by vote whether to accept or reject this drafted
opinion.6
Mr. Goglia is aware of the obligations of the Board to defer to
the FAA's policies, rules, and procedures as relates to sanction,
and he believes this position is incorrect. 3 6 He believes it was a
mistake for Congress to hamstring the NTSB with a statutory
provision that requires the Board to defer to the FAA on the
choice of sanction. 65 Mr. Goglia believes that oral argument
before the NTSB could be of benefit to Board members, but Mr.
Goglia noted that when he was on the Board, it appeared to be
the impression of the Board's chief counsel that he made the
decision as to whether to grant oral argument.366 It is the assess-
ment of Mr. Goglia that one of the reasons the Board decisions
have deteriorated is because the staff has assumed the decision
making functions of the Board, and the Board has not acted to
prevent such action. 6
In addition to the cases discussed in this article, additional
insight into the mindset of the staff attorneys who write the
Board decisions may be found in Roarty.3 68 Roarty involved an
airman who suffered a suspension of his driver's license follow-











368 Roarty, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5261, 2006 WL 3472333 (Nov. 27, 2006).
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glected to report on his third class medical application in
1998.6' In 2000, his medical certificate was revoked for failing
to timely report the 1996 driving under the influence convic-
tions 70 and in his March 7, 2000 medical application he dis-
closed the fact that his medical certificate had been revoked
previously in giving a response to question 13 on the form.7 In
completing his medical application on April 24, 2003, he gave a
negative response to question 13 regarding whether his medical
certificate had ever been denied or suspended or revoked.
The FAA brought an action to revoke his medical certificate3 7 3
and also to revoke on an emergency basis his airman's certificate
on the theory that he had given an intentionally false statement
on the medical application form.3 74
When the case was tried, the Administrator called no wit-
nesses and merely relied upon the documentation in the FAA's
Airman, Medical, and Enforcement files.3 7' The airman testi-
fied in his defense, and he was the only witness at the hearing.3 7 6
The airman testified he did not purposely answer question 13
incorrectly in completing his 2003 medical application and
claimed there was no reason for him to falsify the application.7
Judge Mullins found that the airman did not intentionally falsify
his medical application form with the result that, while the air-
man's medical certificate was revoked, his airman's certificate
was not.378
The FAA appealed the findings ofJudge Mullins, arguing that
the airman was not merely negligent in completing the form but
had acted intentionally.379 The airman repeated the arguments




373 Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 67.413(a) (2008) (authorizing the Agency to suspend
or revoke a medical certificate if all the requisite data has not been provided).
374 Roarty, 2006 WL 3472333, at *1; see also 14 C.F.R. § 67.403(a) (1) (2009)
(prohibiting making fraudulent or intentionally false statements on an applica-
tion for a medical certificate).
375 Roary, 2006 WL 3472333, at *1.
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id. The incomplete data provided by the airman authorized the revocation
of his medical certificate under 14 C.F.R. § 67.413(a), allowing him to complete a
new medical application form and disclose the requested information, but by
prevailing on the charge under 14 C.F.R. § 67.403 (a) (1), the airman was spared
having his airman's certificate revoked.
379 Id. at *2.
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he made at trial and adopted the findings of Judge Mullins."so
The Board reluctantly affirmed the decision of Judge Mullins
and revealed its orientation towards airmen's cases with the fol-
lowing revealing language: "After careful review of the record,
we are constrained to affirm the law judge.""'
The Board continued, writing:
Unfortunately, the Administrator did not call any witnesses, and,
we think, did not aggressively cross-examine respondent regard-
ing his exculpatory claims. It may well be that respondent had a
motive to intentionally falsify his airman application in order to
timely obtain a medical application without delay, which, if
demonstrated, would have been relevant to the credibility assess-
ment of his claim to have made an inadvertent error; the Admin-
istrator, however, did not vigorously pursue such evidence.
Therefore, upon review of the record and the Administrator's
arguments on appeal, we are constrained to conclude that we have
no basis to characterize the law judge's credibility determination
in favor of respondent arbitrary or capricious. 8
The Board, in using the word "constrained" twice in the opin-
ion, clearly evidenced a preference that the Administrator do a
better job and criticized the Administrator for not cross-examin-
ing the airman aggressively and not vigorously pursuing evi-
dence." The word "constrained" is a verb and means "to force,
compel, or oblige; bring about by compulsion," "to confine for-
cibly, as by hands," "to repress or restrain."38 4 One cannot imag-
ine an appellate court in the United States using language like
this to explain to one of the parties that it had no choice but to
render a decision for the adversary. Using words like "con-
strained" and "unfortunately" signals that the personnel who
fashion the opinions for the NTSB would prefer to rule in favor
of the FAA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The author has devoted many years to representing airmen
and aircraft operators in litigation before the NTSB and also
before the FAA. During thirty-two years of practicing law, the
author has observed substantial erosions in the rights of airmen
380 Id.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
382 Id. (emphasis added).
3 Id.
8 WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE, 314 (1994).
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to receive due process of law. Over the past few years, there has
been an acute departure by the Board from binding precedent
in a climate where ad hoc decisions are increasingly the rule,
not the exception.
While the Board's Rules of Practice declare that the FAA
bears the burden of proof in aviation enforcement proceed-
ings, in recent years, the NTSB has declared it has no jurisdic-
tion to entertain legal defenses based on the FAA's refusal to
follow its own rules."8 This is clearly an incorrect legal doctrine
contrary to the decisions in Vitarelli v. Seaton 8  and Randall. 3 8
As the Board abstains from reaching constitutional questions,
litigation before the Board descends into a kind of Darwinian
jungle in which only the fittest (the pilots employing the tal-
ented lawyers with adequate economic resources) survive. For
the fittest, challenges to decisions of the NTSB as arbitrary and
capricious and a departure from binding precedent are not in-
frequently unsuccessful, as demonstrated by Ramaprakash89 and
Moshea.soo However, airmen with equally meritorious positions
but lacking economic resources to fully pursue their appellate
options must suffer a suspension or revocation unjustly.
Increasingly, litigation before the NTSB has become a kind of
charade where everyone pretends the FAA carries the burden of
proof, but seasoned legal practitioners realize the game is not
played that way at all. The way the game is really played is that
the Board allows the FAA to violate its own rules, to tell the
Board what the rules mean, and then the Board "defers" to the
FAA, ignores binding precedent, and renders arbitrary and ca-
pricious decisions. Further, the Board is not above writing an
opinion revising the record and ignoring the fact that proper
arguments were made in order to justify the desired outcome as
evidenced in Dillmon.s91 In cases where the airman prevails, the
Board feels compelled to apologize to the FAA for finding in
favor of the airman, describing the outcome as "unfortunate"
and declaring it is "constrained" to rule on the airman's be-
385 49 C.F.R. § 821.32 (2009) ("In proceedings under 49 U.S.C. 44709, the bur-
den of proof shall be upon the Administrator.").
886
- See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545-46 (1959).
388 See Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624, 3625 (1981).
389 See Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
o90 See Moshea v. NTSB, 570 F.3d 349, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
391 See Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937, at *7 (Oct. 28,
2008).
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half.3 9 2 Besides allowing the FAA to run rampant, ignoring facts
in the record, and altering the record, the Board has persist-
ently demonstrated it is incapable of conducting its responsibil-
ity of "adjudicating" charges brought by the FAA. It is naive to
believe that people with absolutely no legal training or experi-
ence can instantly transform into "adjudicators" merely because
the President of the United States has appointed them to the
Board. That being said, is it any wonder that the Board fails to
understand its duty to "defer" to the credibility determinations
of its administrative lawjudges as demonstrated by the appellate
court decisions in Wedding v. NTSB" and Andrzejewski v. FAA?39 4
Justice Sonia Sotomayor was carefully and exhaustively vetted by
the Senate Judiciary Committee prior to her confirmation to the
Supreme Court."9 While Board nominees are no doubt vetted,
what steps are being taken in the halls of Congress to ensure
that people appointed to the Board understand how to follow
basic legal principles in the adjudication of aviation enforce-
ment actions initiated by the FAA? How many times do mem-
bers of the Board review the transcripts and the exhibits in cases
before them? What internal policies and procedures are in
place at the Board to ensure decisions are thoroughly reviewed,
analyzed and critically evaluated to ensure they follow existing
precedent and will not be reversed by an appellate court as arbi-
trary and capricious?
The Board's attention to evidence admissible in aviation en-
forcement proceedings is akin to the kind of rules one would
see in a high school student body court system, for example,
"Each party shall have the right to present a case-in-chief, or de-
fense, by oral or documentary evidence, to submit evidence in
rebuttal, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be re-
quired for a full and true disclosure of the facts.""'
If there are no teeth in the rules of discovery, then discovery
becomes a farce. It bears repeating that the Board's rules con-
cerning discovery merely declare:
392 See Roarty, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5261, 2006 WL 3472333, at *2 (Nov. 27,
2006).
393 See Wedding v. NTSB, No. 02-73893, 2004 WL 958049 (9th Cir. May 3,
2004).
394 Andrzejewski v. FAA, 548 F.3d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2008).
395 See Robert Barnes, Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, Sotomayor Pledges 'Fidelity to
the Law, WASH. PosT, July 14, 2009.
396 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.38 (2009).
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Those portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that per-
tain to depositions and discovery may be used as a general guide
for discovery practice in proceedings before the Board, where
appropriate. The Federal Rules and the case law that construes
them shall be considered by the Board and its law judges as in-
structive, rather than controlling." 7
It has already been established in this article that the Board is
prone to rendering decisions on an ad hoc basis without regard
to legal precedent or regulatory requirements.' If litigating
before the Board is fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty, this
is even more so in the area of discovery where the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure may be used as a general guide."
While the closest thing a pilot may ever see to a statute of
limitations is Rule 33 of the Board's Rules of Practice, 40 0 as illus-
trated by the discussion above concerning Ramaprakash, the
Board is not above ignoring its own case law and finding that the
severity of the offense authorizes a relaxation of the stale com-
plaint rule even though the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia had to instruct the Board that the rule
provided just the opposite.4 01
Moreover, the recent Board decision in Manin4 02 demon-
strates that the Board fails to appreciate the distinction between the
stale complaint rule, where prejudice to the airman is pre-
sumed,4 0 3 and the equitable doctrine of laches, which may re-
quire that the case be dismissed based on actual prejudice
suffered by the airman as a result of the passage of time from
the underlying event.40 4 The Board's confusing laches with the
stale complaint rule is evident in that it declared the case could
not be dismissed because "falsification amounts to a lack of qual-
ifications to hold a certificate." 40 The problem with the Board's
decision is that while "lack of qualification" may be a basis for
397 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.19(c).
398 See Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
399 See id. at 1125.
400 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.33.
401 See Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1129-30.
42 Manin, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5439, 2008 WL 5972912, at *3 (Apr. 13,
2008).
403 Ramapraksh, 346 F.3d at 1126.
404 Stewart, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4479, 1996 WL519903, at *2 (Aug. 30.
1996).
-5 Manin, 2008 WL 5972912, at *3.
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denying a motion to dismiss based on the stale complaint
rule,40 it has nothing at all to do with the doctrine of laches.
The Board's refusal to require the FAA to abide by its own
rules and declarations by the Board that it does not have juris-
diction to decide such questions requires that the legal practi-
tioner at every turn perfect the record and prepare the case for
an appeal to a U.S. court of appeals because legal issues the
Board should reach are being ignored as evidenced by Mur-
phy407 and Moshea.4 08 If in the past, it was difficult for an airman
to prevail in an action before the NTSB, today it is even more
challenging.
From a public policy standpoint of encouraging airmen to re-
port unsafe or ominous events in the national airspace system,
the Board's decisions in Blum4 09 and Moshea410 will have the op-
posite effect. After all, if the Board decisions deprive the airman
of the right to obtain a waiver of sanction in exchange for mak-
ing an Aviation Safety Report to NASA, why bother with submit-
ting the report?
It is hard to imagine that when Congress authorized the
NTSB to act as the adjudicatory body in aviation enforcement
proceedings, it had the slightest notion the Board would admin-
ister "justice" as has been illustrated by the cases discussed in
this article. The time has come for Congress to recognize that a
person accused of criminal misconduct enjoys far greater rights
to due process than an airman. As the Board continues to disre-
spect airmen with ad hoc decisions that ignore binding prece-
dent and eliminate the necessity of the FAA to make it a prima
facie case, the aviation community will, in turn, disrespect the
Board. This is a toxic environment in need of a massive over-
haul. To that end, the author suggests the following remedies
to the situation:
1. Congress should delete from 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3) lan-
guage that requires the Board to be "bound by all validly
adopted interpretations of laws and regulations the Ad-
ministrator carries out of written agency policy guidance
406 See 49 C.F.R. § 821.33(a) (2009).
407 See Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *14 (Jan. 16,
2008).
408 See Moshea v. NTSB, 570 F.3d 349, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
4 Blum, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5371, 2008 WL 647772, at *2 (Feb. 29, 2008).
410 Moshea, 570 F.3d at 351-52.
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available to the public related to sanctions to be imposed
under this section ...
The reason this language should be deleted from the stat-
ute is because in the current climate, this language is be-
ing employed to relax or even eliminate the FAA's
burden of proof in terms of essential elements of a prima
facie case. This is confirmed by the Board's decision in
Dillmon revoking his airman's certificate when his bribery
conviction was "not material" to his qualifications under
Part 67 of the FAR.412 It was also employed incorrectly in
Murphy413 and Moshea,4 14 when airmen sought to defend
themselves using FAA policy in the form of an enforce-
ment bulletin or advisory circular, and the Board main-
tained it lacked the jurisdiction to require that the FAA
adhere to its own rules and policies. Regrettably, the
Board has employed the language found in 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(d) (3) as an excuse to avoid providing airmen
due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
In a legal system where the FAA makes the rules (the
FAR, enforcement bulletins, advisory circulars, the Aero-
nautical Information Manual, the Air Traffic Control
Handbook, and a host of other regulatory materials),
publishes interpretations of the rules that the Board is
bound to follow, posturing that the FAA bears the burden
of proof in a case to strip an airman of his certificates ele-
vates form over substance. Even if one gives credence to
the notion that the NTSB imposes the burden of proof in
an aviation enforcement action on the FAA, the regula-
tory landscape and the Board's servility to the FAA places
the airman at a distinct disadvantage in this arena. One
way to level the playing field and restore fairness to the
process is to delete the language referenced above from
49 U.S.C. § 44709(d) (3).
2. Congress should specifically declare that the NTSB is not
only authorized but required to address and rule on consti-
tutional issues, including due process of law challenges
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
411 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (d) (3) (2006).
412 See Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937, at *3 (Oct. 7,
2008).
413 Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *2-3 (Jan. 6,
2008).
414 Moshea, 570 F.3d at 350-51.
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Congress could never have reasonably anticipated or be-
lieved that a federal agency would declare that it will not reach
constitutional issues. The Board's declaration that it will
not reach constitutional issues is exacerbated by the fact
that it will allow the FAA to violate its own rules and poli-
cies, as demonstrated in Murphy and Moshea. In Randall,
the Board recognized that it was required to follow due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment and not al-
low the FAA to disregard its own enforcement hand-
book."' In fact, the Board in Randall specifically cited
Vitarelli v. Seaton in declaring that the FAA would not be
allowed to violate its own procedural rules.416 The Con-
gress, in telling the Board that it must address constitu-
tional issues, will merely be reacquainting the Board with
its holding in Randall. An American citizen should not be
deprived of his livelihood or his right to operate an air-
craft or maintain an aircraft by a federal agency such as
the NTSB that allows the FAA to violate its own rules and
policies. The current situation in which this practice is
condoned is a disgrace. Congress must correct this prob-
lem if airmen are to have any faith in the procedures to
be employed in the event the FAA desires to suspend or
revoke their certificates.
3. Congress should revise the language found in 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(d) (3) to declare that the Board is not bound by
the FAA's interpretation of its laws and regulations and/
or of any written policy sanction guidance (i.e., the sanc-
tion guidance table in the FAA Enforcement Handbook),
but that the FAA is allowed to argue any position it cares
to argue about the meaning of its rules and regulations or
the application of its sanction guidance table, and that
the airman is allowed to do so as well. It is obvious that
the effect of the language found in 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(d) (3), requiring the Board to be bound by the
FAA's interpretations of its rules and regulations and its
policy guidance on sanctions, has created no shortage of
mischief at the NTSB. This pernicious language has been em-
ployed as a device to avoid the application of constitutional prin-
ciples, to deprive airmen of their due process rights, and to
deprive airmen of defenses which are based on the FAA's
415 Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624, 3625-26 (1981).
416 Id. at 3626 (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959)).
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own rules and policies.m This state of affairs, as dis-
cussed above, is unacceptable. The system may be reha-
bilitated by having the offending language in the statute
deleted and replaced with a more balanced and reasoned
interpretation of the law as opposed to one which binds
the NTSB in lockstep with the FAA. Respectfully, Con-
gress could never have anticipated that the offending lan-
guage found in the statute could have been employed by
the Board to poison due process and fundamental fair-
ness in aviation enforcement proceedings. Nevertheless,
that has, in fact, been the case, as illustrated by the cases
discussed above. Neither the FAA nor the airman should
have a competitive advantage when it comes to the appli-
cation or interpretation of the law or FAA policies or rules
or regulations.
4. Congress should require the Board to adopt the Federal
Rules of Evidence as applying in aviation enforcement
proceedings. While Rule 38 of the Board's Rules of Prac-
tice allows the parties to submit evidence and conduct
cross-examination,4 18 the fact is that this same rule per-
mits the admission of hearsay, and a written statement
cannot be cross-examined. The pernicious effects of al-
lowing inadmissible hearsay to have an influence in the
outcome of Board decisions has been illustrated in Magru-
der, where the FAA was permitted to sponsor hearsay into
the record and to rely on an unauthenticated exhibit in
order to defeat the airman's claim for attorney's fees.4 19
The present rules of the NTSB do not fulfill due process
obligations that should be satisfied by a tribunal, albeit
administrative, that purports to dispense justice. The only
way to ensure the proceedings are just is to have rules of
evidence which have a body of case law that has been de-
veloped and accepted over time. Ad hoc rules (or no
rules) which allow a person out of court not under oath
to effectively testify against an airman are inconsistent
with the fundamental due process of law. Accordingly,
Congress should mandate that the Board adopt the Fed-
417 See, e.g., Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095 (Jan. 16,
2008); Moshea, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5328, 2007 WL 3088248 (Oct. 17, 2007);
Moshea v. NTSB, 570 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
418 See 49 CFR § 821.38 (2009).
419 In re Magruder, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5278, 2007 WL 1233535, at *2-3
(Apr. 10, 2007).
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eral Rules of Evidence as applying in aviation enforce-
ment proceedings.
5. Congress should mandate that the Board adopt as appli-
cable in aviation enforcement proceedings the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The law is well settled that the
airman's certificate is a protected property or liberty in-
terest.4 20 Because of the constitutional protections that
do apply to an airman's certificate, airmen should expect
that they can obtain legitimate discovery from the FAA,
and if the FAA fails in that regard, then the administrative
law judge will have the discretion and legal authority to
impose sanctions, including dismissing the FAA's com-
plaint and awarding attorney's fees to the airman. As part
and parcel of the application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, any FAA employee who destroys evidence or
falsifies or conceals evidence should be chargeable in a
U.S. district court with a felony for obstruction of justice.
If any FAA attorney is involved or knows of this conduct,
then the attorney should be chargeable as well. In order
to ensure that we have a balanced and fair system to be
employed in disciplining airmen, we must have rules of
procedure, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
well developed and accepted, with a body of case law that
will strengthen and empower the administrative law judge
in dispensing justice consistent with fundamental princi-
ples of due process.
6. Congress should require that, in the event the FAA pur-
sues an action that was not substantially justified in fact
and in law, the FAA should be required to pay the actual
legal fees and case expenses incurred by the pilot. Under
the existing Board rules implementing the Equal Access
to Justice Act,4 2 1 an airman who has prevailed in an unjus-
tified enforcement action brought by the FAA is limited
to attorney's fees capped at seventy-five dollars per hour
(according to the 1981 Consumer Price Index) and then
adjusted for inflation to the current Consumer Price In-
dex, or currently about one hundred and fifty-six dollars
per hour.42 2 The attorney's fees permitted by the Board's
420 See Green v. Brantley, 719 F. Supp. 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1989); White v. Franklin,
637 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
421 49 C.F.R. § 826 (2009).
422 See 49 C.F.R. § 826.6.
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rules are less than one-half the billing rate of any sea-
soned or experienced aviation attorney.4 23 Under the
current rules, even if the airman prevails and is awarded
legal fees, he will not be fully compensated. Congres-
sional action in this regard will require revision of the at-
torney billing rates presently permitted in the Equal
Access to Justice Act. 4 24
Moreover, as further evidence of the Board's inability to
adhere to its own rules as relates to airmens' efforts to
recover attorney fees, the reader is requested to consider
In re Turner, in which the Board reversed an award of at-
torney's fees by Chief Administrative LawJudge Fowler in
favor of the airmen in the amount of $12,475.00.425 In an
opinion that defies logic, the Board declared that, where
the FAA issued orders of suspension for allegedly flying
an unairworthy Learjet 60, withdrew a civil penalty action
against the aircraft's owner on the condition it would not
seek attorney's fees, and withdrew certificate action
against the airmen afterJudge Fowler set the matter down
for hearing, the airmen were not the "prevailing parties"
because the FAA dismissed the charges and there never
was a "hearing" at which the airmen could "prevail."4 2 6
The Board reversed the attorneys' fees award even though
its own rules provided the airmen would be the prevailing
parties upon "issuance of a final order or any other final
resolution of a proceeding, such as a settlement or volun-
tary dismissaL"4 2 7
7. Congress should, by resolution, declare that obstruction
ofjustice by the FAA will not be tolerated and require the
Board to report suspected criminal acts by any Agency
employee to the Department of Justice for investigation
and/or prosecution. Such action by Congress should act
as a deterrent to rogue inspectors who destroy and/or
conceal exculpatory evidence, such as eye witness state-
423 Based on the author's experience, seasoned aviation lawyers typically bill at
or above a billing rate of four hundred dollars per hour.
424 See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1) (A) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (D) (2)
(2006) (capping attorney's fees at the rate of $125.00 per hour). It simply is not
possible to retain the services of competent counsel at this hourly rate.
425 In re Turner, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5467, 2009 WL 2419616, at *14 (July
29, 2009).
426 Id. at *2.
427 49 C.F.R. § 826.24(c) (emphasis added).
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ments given to the Agency inspector which exonerate the
airman but mysteriously fail to find their way into the en-
forcement investigative report. Currently, it is unlawful
"to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper ad-
ministration of the law under which any pending pro-
ceeding is being had before any department or agency of
the United States."4 28 Deliberate spoliation of evidence
by any FAA employee should be criminally sanctioned in
addition to any sanctions imposed by the ALJ hearing the
case.
8. Congress should direct an investigation into the manner
in which the Board's legal staff fashions opinions. As part
of this investigation, Congress should hear from, among
others, former NTSB member Goglia to have the benefit
of his insight and perspective on the inner workings of
the Board. If Congress finds the Board's legal staff is not
receiving adequate supervision, procedural and institu-
tional changes should be implemented by the NTSB.
9. Congress should, by resolution or other appropriate pro-
cedure, recommend to the Board that oral argument be
provided on appeals in every case where the FAA revokes
the airman's certificate on an emergency basis as well as
in cases presenting factually complex issues.
The author hopes this article will stimulate debate in Con-
gress about the lack of due process being afforded airmen in the
aviation enforcement system. The foregoing discussion has
been a critical analysis of the performance of the Board with the
expectation and hope that Congress will ask itself if the system de-
scribed in this article is the kind of system Congress had in mind when it
made the NTSB the arbiter in FAA enforcement actions against pilots. If
after reading this article, Congress concludes the aviation en-
forcement system in America is seriously in need of repair, one
can only hope that a Congressional investigation into the prac-
tices of the Board with respect to aviation enforcement proceed-
ings will result in the system being overhauled, rehabilitated,
and made more rational and fair. Until and unless that takes
place, the level ofjustice dispensed to airmen will fall below any
standard of which this great nation can be proud.
428 See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
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